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INTRODUCTION
“A monthly salary doesn’t even buy you a box of cereal.”
Barbara Mendez is the mother of eight-month-old, Nely.1 Nely was
born with a life-threatening heart condition which causes blood to move
erratically between her heart and lungs.2 Nely’s only solution is a highly
specialized and delicate surgical procedure.3 Because this procedure is
extremely specialized, only one hospital in Venezuela offers this
corrective surgery.4 Nely has been on the waitlist for this corrective
surgery since the day she was born.5 To compound Nely’s dire situation,
she is susceptible to infections that require antibiotics, which are difficult
to find in Venezuela—leaving many forced to purchase medication on
black market at exorbitant costs.6 As a result, Nely’s mother must forgo
necessities, such as diapers and baby food, to pay for Nely’s life saving
medicine.7 Nely’s only hope is to survive long enough to get the surgery
she so desperately needs.8

1. Mariana Zuñiga, Venezuelan Voices: The Real-Life Stories Beyond the Protests,
NEW HUMANITARIAN (May 19, 2017), https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/259427
[https://perma.cc/67A6-TE3X].
2. Id. See generally Ariane Marelli et al., Brain in Congenital Heart Disease Across the
Lifespan, 133 CIRCULATION 1951, 1951–53 (2016) (echoing adverse effects of children born with
congenital heart disease and the risk factors aggravated without proper care).
3. Zuñiga, supra note 1.
4. Compare id. (emphasizing the limitations in Venezuela as the only hospital in the country
capable of providing the complex procedure has less than half of their operating rooms
functioning), with Melody Schreiber, Researchers are Surprised by the Magnitude of Venezuela’s
Health Crisis, NPR (Apr. 5, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/04/
05/709969632/researchers-are-surprised-by-the-magnitude-of-venezuelas-health-crisis
[https://
perma.cc/FV5T-WFWV] (bolstering the argument that conditions of hospitals in Venezuela need
international attention because “patients who go to the hospital need to bring not only their own
food but also medical supplies like syringes and scalpels as well as their own soap and water.”).
5. Zuñiga, supra note 1.
6. See id. (reporting eighty-five percent of necessary medications are unavailable in
Venezuela); see also Schreiber, supra note 4 (illustrating how the difficulty of accessing medical
attention in Venezuela leads Venezuelans with no alternative except fleeing to other countries).
7. Zuñiga, supra note 1(portraying the horrific reality Nely’s mother faces by describing
how she must replace diapers with rags in order to afford medication).
8. Id.; see Schreiber, supra note 4 (“[I]nfant mortality rose by 30 percent—from 8,812
children under age 1 dying in 2015 to 11,466 children the following year.”).
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Vanessa Posada grew up in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, and went
to college to get a job as a teacher.9 Like many Venezuelan citizens,
Vanessa and her husband Adolfo’s salaries barely cover the cost of basic
necessities—including food.10 At first, the family eliminated meat from
their diet.11 As their situation became more dire, additional food was
eliminated from their diet, and the family survived off of rice and
beans.12 Their situation has become so extreme that their evening meals
consist of a single plantain between them or skipping dinner entirely, all
to ensure their son has something to eat.13 Vanessa has lost more than
ten kilos in less than a year.14 Student attendance at Vanessa’s school is
diminishing—as it is throughout Venezuela—due to sickness, weakness,
and other ailments caused by lack of food resources.15 An estimated one
million children are no longer able to attend school regularly.16 When
children are able to attend school, they find classes are regularly cancelled
due to teacher absences.17

9. Zuñiga, supra note 1.
10. Id. See generally Stefano Pozzebon & Patrick Gillespie, Venezuelans are Losing
Weight Amid Food Shortages, Skyrocketing Prices, CNN BUS. (May 3, 2017, 10:47 AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/03/news/economy/venezuela-food-prices/ [https://perma.cc/NZ
S6-9HLQ] (“In March, a basket of basic grocery items—including eggs, milk and fruit—cost
772,614 bolivares, or close to four times the monthly minimum wage, according to the Venezuelabased Center of Social Analysis and Documentation . . . .”).
11. Zuñiga, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., id. (“According to an annual survey of living conditions in Venezuela . . . three
out of every four Venezuelans lost an average of 8.7 kilos last year.”); Pozzebon & Gillespie, supra
note 10 (describing how Maduro raised the minimum wage in Venezuela by sixty percent even
though it does not match the skyrocketing prices of necessities and “won’t buy much at the
supermarket.”).
14. Zuñiga, supra note 1. See generally Pozzebon & Gillespie, supra note 10 (reiterating
how the extreme poverty and rising cost of food in Venezuela leave many with no option except to
go without meals).
15. See Zuñiga, supra note 1 (illustrating the adverse effects of malnourishment and its
impact not only on the health of children but on their education).
16. Id.; see Erica Sanchez & Leah Rodriguez, 4 Ways the Venezuela Crisis is Affecting
Children’s Education, GLOB. CITIZEN (June 14, 2019), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/
venezuela-crisis-childrens-education/#:~:text=Schools%20in%20Venezuela%20are%20strugglin
g%20to%20keep%20their%20doors%20open.&text=At%20the%20beginning%20of%20the,aged
%20children%20have%20dropped%20out [https://perma.cc/Z5SG-ZSZZ] (noting the economic
crisis and its effect on not only the food supply but the affordability of school supplies).
17. Zuñiga, supra note 1.
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The following are examples of daily life stories of everyday people that
are barely surviving and trapped in Venezuela because they cannot afford
to leave:18
1. Javier Dominguez owns a bakery that he is unable to run due
to his inability to sell bread because the government stopped
delivering flour.19
2. Doctor Christian Ramos is unable to treat patients because of
the lack in supplies or medications.20
3. Jesus Lopez can no longer work as a hairdresser because of the
shortages of supplies and water.21
4. Franco Rojas owns a restaurant that he can no longer run or
serve food in because there is no rice or pasta.22
5. Rosa Blanco has not seen her daughter because she left to
Mexico due to the insecurity in Venezuela.23
I. HISTORY
Ninety percent of Venezuelans live in abject poverty.24 More than one
in ten children suffer from malnutrition, and nearly ten percent of
18. Natalie Gallon & Stefano Pozzebon, A Day in the Life of Venezuelans: Anything but
Normal, CNN (June 29, 2017, 1:40 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/americas/venezuelashortages-impact-lives/index.html [https://perma.cc/9MMN-KXXA] (acknowledging the reality
citizens of Venezuela face in economic and political turmoil, leaving many with few options for
survival when food, medicine, and other basic needs are severely limited).
19. See id. (depicting the economic standstill caused by the government and its effect on
Venezuelan business owners).
20. Id. (emphasizing the economic and political turmoil effect on the health of Venezuelan
citizens).
21. See id. (illustrating how water shortages add pressure to businesses in the Venezuelan
work force).
22. See id. (revealing the impossibility of cooking foods without staple items and not being
able to find them anywhere aside from black markets or other cities hours away); see also Zuñiga,
supra note 1 (depicting the struggle everyday Venezuelans have in purchasing food with the current
shortage).
23. See Gallon & Pozzebon, supra note 18 (analyzing how the lack of opportunities and
overall insecurity in Venezuela led many Venezuelans to leave the country).
24. Venezuela at a Crossroads: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of
Representatives, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (Statement of Hon. Albio Sires, chairman of the
subcommittee) https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20190213/108897/HHRG-116-FA00Transcript-20190213.pdf [https://perma.cc/C83E-SQ2X].
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Venezuela’s population of thirty-one million have fled their home
country.25 This mass exodus is compounding the already devastated
Venezuelan economy, an economy that should be one of the wealthiest
and prosperous in the hemisphere.26
The continued corruption, incompetence, and mismanagement of the
Venezuelan government led by both Nicolas Maduro and Hugo Chavez
have decimated a once thriving country.27 The incompetency of both
Chavez and Maduro’s leadership has led Venezuela to have an inflation
rate of more than 700 percent making their currency of Bolivares nearly
worthless.28 Beginning with Chavez, he slowly instituted many
programs to reform the country but was ultimately striving to reduce the
checks and balances on his authority.29

25. Venezuela at a Crossroads: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of
Representatives, 116th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter Crossroads Hearing] (Statement of Ted Yoho,
Representative for Ambassador Rooney) https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/2019
0213/108897/HHRG-116-FA00-Transcript-20190213.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C83E-SQ2X]
(correlating the number of children suffering from malnutrition with the only other option being
fleeing Venezuela to access basic resources).
26. See generally Megan Janetsky, Fleeing Venezuela, Migrants Flood Colombia Amid
Region’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis in Decades, USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2018, 7:59 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/11/19/venezuela-colombia-migrants-nicolasmaduro-humanitarian-crisis-migrants-food-and-medicine-shortages/1808395002/ [https://perma.
cc/9UWS-QERX] (asserting nearly three million people have fled Venezuela); see also Crossroads
Hearing, supra note 25, at 6 (Statement of Ted Yoho) (stressing the stark contrast between
Venezuela’s current climate and the country’s potential to be prosperous).
27. Crossroads Hearing, supra note 25, at 6, 7 (Statement of Ted Yoho) (tracing
Venezuela’s current turmoil to Chavez’s and Maduro’s corrupt presidential administrations).
28. See Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, How Venezuela Went from the Richest Economy in
South America to the Brink of Financial Ruin, INDEP. (May 21, 2017, 17:07 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/how-venezuela-went-from-the-richest-economyin-south-america-to-the-brink-of-financial-ruin-a7740616.html [https://perma.cc/AM6P-QESH]
(“Maduro, who took power when Chavez died in 2013, inherited an economy that was a
shambles . . . . Unable to pay for subsidiaries and welfare programs, Maduro printed more money.
When this drove up inflation, making basic foods unaffordable, he instituted price
controls . . . [which] made imports prohibitively expensive. Businesses shut down. [Yet] Maduro
printed more money, and inflation grew again. Food became scarce. Unrest deepened, and
Maduro’s survival grew more contingent on handouts he could not afford. This cycle destroyed
Venezuela’s economy.”); see also AP Archive, Venezuelans Recycle Worthless Bolivar Bills into
Crafts, YOUTUBE (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3tpehKSJwA&feature=
youtu.be [https://perma.cc/L2QB-LRZT] (showing the citizens of Venezuela using the Bolivares
to make wallets, belts, and purses out of the currency).
29. See Fisher & Taub, supra note 28 (depicting Chavez’s role in modifying the Venezuelan
government to the country’s detriment but to his gain).
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A. Hugo Chavez
Hugo Chavez was elected as the President of Venezuela in 1998.30
Chavez was a former Lieutenant Colonel in the Venezuelan Military.31
Chavez launched the “Bolivarian Revolution,” which established a
brand-new constitution and policies funded by the high oil prices.32
Through manipulation, Chavez utilized the Constituent Assembly as a
means to dismantle the current political institutions.33 When the courts
challenged Chavez, he would suspend anyone that disagreed with him
and packed the courts with judges that supported him.34 Chavez
administered a plethora of amendments to the constitution, such as
eradicating term limits of presidency, and converting unilateral
declarations of a national emergency to a public referendum.35 In 2005,
President Chavez initiated regulations on the media to provide fines and
prison terms for slandering public figures.36 During Chavez’s
administration, Venezuela’s national debt went from $22 billion to
approximately $70 billion.37 Additionally during Chavez’s time,
Venezuela had an income of $700 billion but Venezuelan citizens are

30. MAX G. MANWARING, VENEZUELA’S HUGO CHAVEZ: BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM, AND
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 1 (Oct. 2005).
31. Id.
32. Venezuela Profile—Timeline, BBC (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldlatin-america-19652436 [https://perma.cc/T9EW-M6QP] (showcasing governmental overhaul
fueled by Chavez’s disenchantment with established parties).
33. See Gustavo Coronel, The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela, CATO INST.
(Mar. 4, 2008), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/corruption-democracy-venezuela
[https://perma.cc/AU9F-TAZ3] (elaborating on the corrupt tactics Chavez used during his
presidency to gain control of the country).
34. See Fisher & Taub, supra note 28 (discussing how Chavez gutted and suspended
unfriendly judges, saw politics as a zero-sum battle, and use of power to exploit organized crime
by granting tacit impunity to armed groups he formed an alliance with).
35. Joe Parkin Daniels, Venezuela: Who is Juan Guaido, The Man Who Declared Himself
President?, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2019, 14:02 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2019/jan/15/juan-guaido-venezuelan-opposition-leader-challenging-maduros-rule [https://
perma.cc/J8FU-3HN2] (illustrating Chavez’s self-serving changes to the Venezuelan Constitution
to continue gaining power over the country).
36. Venezuela Profile—Timeline, supra note 32 (identifying oppressive media regulations
Chavez implemented when faced with criticism during his presidency).
37. Coronel, supra note 33 (demonstrating the astronomical increase of debt accrued under
Chavez’s leadership was based on corruption, and the pocketing money into Chavez’s pockets
without transparency or accountability).
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unaware where exactly this money is going.38 Despite the substantial
sum of money, none was allocated to public services, such as health or
education programs.39 Although the money was nowhere to be found
within public programs, some of the money was utilized by Chavez “to
buy political loyalties.”40
Corruption throughout the country became a way of life in Venezuelan
society.41 Crime and violence has become rampant throughout the
country.42 The murder rate per 100 thousand citizens rose from twentyfive in 1999 to forty-five in 2011.43 After Hugo Chavez’s death in March
of 2013 from cancer,44 the victims of murder throughout the country
were equivalent to the number of civilian casualties in Iraq in 2004.45
Chavez hand-picked Nicolas Maduro as his successor, who barely won
by taking merely a 50.6% of the vote against his opponent.46 A “special”
38. Id. (“This formidable amount of money is nowhere to be seen in terms of public works
or effective health and education programs . . . [and] none of the[] budgets are discussed publicly
or subject to accountability.”).
39. Id. (emphasizing the irregularities in the management of public funds derives from
Chavez’s decision to use the money for foreign accounts such as donations to Cuba, and to increase
his political power and loyalties in his region).
40. Id. (demonstrating how funding was utilized to push Chavez’s political agenda and not
to assist the citizens).
41. Id. (“Chavez’s presidency . . . led to the highest levels of government corruption ever
experienced in Venezuela. [Such corruption is due to] money going directly into Chavez’s pockets;
a mediocre management team working without transparency or accountability; the ideological
predilections of Chavez, which led him to try to play a messianic role in Latin America, and even
world affairs; and the polices of handouts put in place by Chavez to keep the Venezuelan masses
politically loyal.”).
42. Stephen Keppel, 5 Ways Hugo Chavez Has Destroyed the Venezuelan Economy, ABC
NEWS (Jan. 17, 2013, 7:22 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/ways-chavezdestroyed-venezuelan-economy/story?id=18239956 [https://perma.cc/KW64-2W2H] (depicting
the rise in murder under Chavez’s regime and its influence on the workforce in Venezuela).
43. Id. (“[V]iolence has an economic impact . . . [and has made it] more challenging and
dangerous than ever to do business and go to work in Venezuela [under Chavez’s regime and
legacy].”).
44. Venezuela Profile—Timeline, supra note 32.
45. Fisher & Taub, supra note 28.
46. Juan Forero, Nicolas Maduro Narrowly Wins Presidential Election in Venezuela,
WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/hugo-chavez-heir-nicolasmaduro-leads-in-polls-ahead-of-vote/2013/04/14/334cd2ba-a54b-11e2-9e1c-bb0fb0c2edd9_story.
html?utm_term=.8534e37bc463 [https://perma.cc/2BC2-C6JE] (“With nearly all the votes
counted, electoral authorities said late Sunday evening that Maduro had taken 50.6 percent of the
vote to just under 50 percent for Henrique Capriles, a youthful challenger who had only days to
mount a campaign against a powerful and tested electoral machine.”); see also Zeesham Aleem,
How Venezuela Went from a Rich Democracy to a Dictatorship on the Brink of Collapse, VOX
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presidential election was held giving the opposing candidate, Henrique
Capriles, only days to prepare.47 Maduro beat Capriles which was no
surprise to anyone.48
B. Nicolas Maduro
Maduro began using his authority as President to rule over the
country.49 Maduro used his power to appoint new members to the
Supreme Court that were dedicated supporters of him with the ultimate
goal of removing and eliminating the powers of the National Assembly
to increase his control over the country.50 The Opposition finally held a
majority of the National Assembly in 2016,51 after 17 years of a socialist
majority.52 Moreover, the Supreme Court, which supports Maduro, has
nullified nearly almost every law in the nation.53
(Sept. 17, 2017, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/19/16189742/venezuela-madurodictator-chavez-collapse [https://perma.cc/YD7J-RKEA]; Patrick J. Kiger, How Venezuela Fell
from the Richest Country in South America into Crisis, HIST. (May 9, 2019),
https://www.history.com/news/venezuela-chavez-maduro-crisis [https://perma.cc/F4SE-7U8Z].
See generally Venezuela Profile—Timeline, supra note 32 (illustrating Nicolas Maduro was chosen
by Hugo Chavez to be his successor and was elected president “by a narrow margin” while his
opponent unsuccessfully challenged the result).
47. Aleem, supra note 46 ; Forero, supra note 46.
48. Kiger, supra note 46 ; Venezuela Profile—Timeline, supra note 32 (acknowledging how
although Maduro had previously been selected by Chavez who won by a landslide in his first
election, Maduro won by only a small margin which the results have been highly contested); Forero,
supra note 46.
49. Kiger, supra note 46 (detailing Maduro’s approach to leadership after obtaining
presidency).
50. Id. (depicting tactics Maduro used to provide more power to himself while limiting those
who held him accountable).
51. See generally Aleem, supra note 46 (“It was quickly apparent that Maduro was no
Chávez. . . . [I]n addition to being a poor politician, Maduro has lacked Chávez’s other exceptional
asset for most of his time in office: oil money. After oil prices crashed in late 2014, Venezuela’s
economy crashed with it. . . . As Venezuela’s economy has collapsed, Maduro’s popularity has
also plummeted, and protest movements have rocked the country. . . . ‘The opposition is betting if
they gain in the regional elections, they can reinvigorate their mostly dejected forces and take on
Maduro’ . . . .”); see generally Venezuela Events of 2018, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/venezuela
[https://perma.cc/MZ4QUXTV] (recognizing the shift in the legislative branch under Maduro’s presidency).
52. Opposition Ends Decades of Socialist Rule in Venezuela, DW (May 1, 2016),
https://www.dw.com/en/opposition-ends-decades-of-socialist-rule-in-venezuela/a-18962403
[https://perma.cc/SQD9-2RRN].
53. See Kirk Semple, Venezuela’s Two Legislatures Duel, but Only One Has Ammunition,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/world/americas/venezuela-
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The Maduro government quickly expanded its power over media, by
criminalizing journalists who criticized the Maduro administration and
government officials.54 A prime example is how Maduro stopped an
interview with Jorge Ramos due to interview questions about the many
atrocities rumored to be directed by Maduro himself.55 President
Maduro ordered his security agents to confiscate the journalist’s
equipment and recordings.56 Ramos’ equipment was held for three
months.57 Ramos’ equipment was eventually returned, but not before
the recordings were uploaded to social media for the world to see.58
Since Maduro has come into power in 2013, military and police have
“arbitrarily detained” thousands of protestors, committed acts of torture,
and carried out hundreds of brutal killings.59 The government only has
one goal, ensuring those in the Opposition are eliminated.60 It’s stated
that in one weekend Security Forces killed at least 25 people and injured
more than 285 because they protested the administration.61 From
national-assembly-maduro.html [https://perma.cc/969B-APWY] (“[Maduro] and his allies started
chipping away at congressional powers. The Supreme Court, stacked with judges loyal to
Mr. Maduro, nullified nearly all pieces of legislation that the Assembly passed in 2016 and stripped
it of its budgetary oversight powers . . . .”).
54. See, e.g., Interview by Jorge Ramos with Nicolas Maduro, Dictator of Venezuela, in
Urdaneta Avenue, Caracas (June 2, 2019), https://jorgeramos.com/en/real-america-with-jorgeramos-interview-with-a-dictator/ [https://perma.cc/46X2-9GNY] [hereinafter Interview by
Jorge Ramos] (illustrating Jorge Ramos’ experience interviewing Maduro and having his
equipment confiscated due to Maduro’s dislike of the questioning). See generally HUM. RTS.
WATCH, supra note 51 (describing how the government expanded and abused its power to regulate
and reduce dissenting media outlets).
55. Interview by Jorge Ramos, supra note 54 (displaying a tumultuous interview with
Nicolas Maduro, who deflected controversial questions and abruptly ended the interview).
56. Id. (“Univision was able to recover the interview from confidential sources three months
after Jorge Ramos and his team were detained.”).
57. Id. (discussing Maduro’s underlying control over media, especially when journalists
challenge his leadership and source of power).
58. Id. (asserting the Venezuelan government did as much as they could to prevent
individuals from seeing this interview).
59. Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and U.S. Policy Responses:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, 116th
Cong. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Maduro Hearing] (statement by Hon. Albio Sires, chairman of the
subcommittee).
60. Id. See generally Interview by Jorge Ramos, supra note 54 (showing how media
personal are treated when challenging Maduro’s authoritarian leadership).
61. Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and U.S. Policy Responses:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, 116th
Cong. 6 (2019) (statement by Ted S. Yoho, reading Ambassador Rooney’s opening statement).
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January to May 2019, there were sixty-six documented deaths during
protests, fifty-two of which are directly attributed to government security
forces.62 According to the United Nations (UN), as of May 31, 2019,
793 people remained arbitrarily deprived of their liberty.63
By 2018, Maduro had forced over 3 million Venezuelans to leave their
home country due to poverty and a shortage of food and medicine.64 By
mid-2019, that number skyrocketed and now over 4 million Venezuelans
are refugees and migrants in other countries.65 Meanwhile, Maduro’s
personal wealth continues to increase due to drug trafficking and money
laundering.66
Venezuela’s health system has drastically declined since 2017.67
There has been a large spread of vaccine-preventable diseases, such as
measles and diphtheria, as well as infectious diseases such as malaria and
62. UN Human Rights Report on Venezuela Urges Immediate Measure to Remedy Grave
Rights Violations, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OF THE OFF. HIGH COMM’R (July 4, 2019),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24788&LangID=E
[https://perma.cc/8XV3-XL7E] (describing how pro-government armed civilian groups, known as
Colectivos, have contributed to deteriorating the situation in Venezuela by exercising social control
and helping repress demonstrations).
63. Id.; Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact Finding Mission
on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, HUM. RTS. COUNCIL 6 (Sept. 15, 2020)
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFMV/A_HRC_45_CRP.11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W454-WMLB].
64. See generally Maduro Hearing, supra note 59 (statement by Hon. Albio Sires, chairman
of the subcommittee) (“Maduro has caused an economic collapse that has left nearly 90 percent of
Venezuelans in poverty, and forced over 3 million Venezuelans to leave their country.”); see also
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R , supra note 62 (reiterating large sections
of the Venezuelan population do not have access to essentials such as food).
65. See Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela Top 4 Million: UNHCR and IOM,
UNHCR (June 7, 2019) https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/6/5cfa2a4a4/refugeesmigrants-venezuela-top-4-million-unhcr-iom.html [https://perma.cc/2B3K-7HGL] (concluding
Venezuelans are one of the single largest population groups displaced from their country).
66. See Maduro Hearing, supra note 59 (statement by Hon. Albio Sires, chairman of the
subcommittee) (contrasting the experience of an average Venezuelan citizen suffering from poverty
and food shortages to the wealth Maduro and his regime have accumulated).
67. See Venezuela’s Humanitarian Emergency, Large Scale UN Response Needed to
Address Health and Food Crises, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/
2019/04/04/venezuelas-humanitarian-emergency/large-scale-un-response-needed-address-health
[https://perma.cc/98SQ-UKRL] (noting the increase in preventable diseases, lack of medication for
those living with HIV, and rise in maternal and infant mortality). See generally UNITED NATIONS
HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R , supra note 62 (“The health situation in the country is dire,
with hospitals lacking staff, supplies, medicines and electricity to keep vital machinery
running. . . . [B]etween November 2018 and February 2019, 1,157 people died because of lack of
supplies in hospitals.”).
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tuberculosis.68 Hospitals are lacking in staff, supplies, medicines, and
even electricity.69 Between November of 2018 and February of 2019,
1,557 people died due to a lack of basic supplies in hospitals throughout
the country.70 Maduro’s government claims they have made continuous
and ongoing efforts to increase the access for the Venezuelan population
to food through many social programs, but many citizens argue the aid
they so desperately need is restricted to only those who support the
government.71
In 2016, infant mortality rose thirty percent and maternal mortality rose
sixty-five percent in just one year.72 The health minister was fired a few
days after releasing this data to the public.73 No statistics have been
released since.74 Venezuelan authorities under Maduro’s direction
consistently hinder the release of these statistics, all in an attempt to hide
the growing health crisis.75 Maduro blames the United States for all of
Venezuela’s catastrophic conditions yet consistently insists there is no
humanitarian crisis.76

68. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 67 (“Between 2008 and 2015, only a single
case of measles was recorded (in 2012), since June 2017, more than 9,300 cases of measles have
been reported . . . . Venezuela did not experience a single case of diphtheria between 2006 and
2015, but more than 2,500 suspected cases have been reported since July 2016, including more than
1,500 confirmed cases . . . . The World Health Organization reports that confirmed malaria cases
in Venezuela have consistently increased in recent years-from fewer than 36,000 in 2009 to more
than 414,000 in 2017 . . . . The TB incidence rate has increased constantly since 2014, reaching 42
per 100,000 in 2017—the highest seen in Venezuela in 40 years.”).
69. UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R , supra note 62.
70. Id.
71. Id. (highlighting the Venezuelan government’s failure to uphold its obligation to ensure
the rights to food and health for all citizens, despite efforts to tackle the situation through social
programs).
72. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 67.
73. Id. (insinuating the firing of the health minister after the release of epidemiological data
is a result of the Venezuelan government’s attempts to suppress information).
74. Id.
75. Id. (analyzing Maduro’s attempt to conceal the health crisis by suppressing data and
retaliating against those who publish information regarding the food and medicine shortages
proving there is a humanitarian crisis).
76. Tom Llamas et al., Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro Accuses US Government of
Fabricating a Crisis to Start War in South America, ABC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2019, 4:10 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/International/maduro-accuses-us-government-fabricating-crisis-start-war/
story?id=61215212 [https://perma.cc/5PCB-PKZX] (chastising Maduro’s attempt to accuse the
U.S. government of trying to fabricate a crisis in order to deflect from the growing crisis in the
country).
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The U.S. government has issued (and continues to issue) many
sanctions, to President Maduro, his government, and other key
officials.77 The U.S. Treasury Department issued sanctions to at least
132 Venezuelan individuals, Venezuela’s state oil company, government,
and central bank.78 The State Department has also revoked the visas of
The United States financially
many Venezuelan individuals.79
sanctioned President Maduro, his wife, his son, Executive Vice President
Delcy Rodriguez, eight Supreme Court judges, the leaders of Venezuela’s
army, national guard, and national police.80 These sanctions are based
on allegations of corruption, drug trafficking, and human rights abuses.81
While these sanctions have not successfully led to a political transition,
they do place increased pressure on the Maduro government.82
Venezuelan government officials are violating the obligation they have
to their citizens to ensure their rights to basic food and health are met.83
The Venezuelan government, including Maduro, would rather watch
their citizens starve to death than release some of the power they hold

77. See Luke Taylor, Venezuela: New US Sanctions Pressure Maduro but ‘Risk
Exacerbating Humanitarian Crisis and Torpedoing Negotiations,’ INDEP. (Aug. 11, 2019,
18:11 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/venezuela-us-sanctions-maduroguaido-humanitarian-crisis-white-house-a9051786.html [https://perma.cc/ZL28-BP5Y] (depicting
harsh sanctions on Venezuelan government in an attempt to hinder Maduro and his administration
to potentially weaken the government).
78. Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, CONG. RSCH. SERV., https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/IF10715.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXA9-THLF] (Oct. 30, 2020) (describing the use of
sanctions by the United States as a policy tool in response to the activities of the Venezuelan
government).
79. Id. (highlighting the Trump Administration’s expansion of sanctions as the political and
economic crisis in Venezuela worsens).
80. Id.
81. Scott Smith, Trump: Venezuelan Socialist President Could Easily be Toppled by
Military, MIL. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/
09/26/trump-venezuelan-socialist-president-could-easily-be-toppled-by-military/ [https://perma.cc
/T8E7-ZZ48] (“Over the past two years the Trump administration has sanctioned dozens of
individuals, including Maduro himself, on allegations of corruption, drug trafficking, and human
rights abuses.”).
82. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 78 (referring to the accelerating decline in Venezuela’s
oil production as a direct result of the sanctions imposed by the United States).
83. UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R , supra note 62 (depicting the
growing concern for citizens of Venezuela and their living conditions).
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over the country.84
C. Juan Guaidó
Juan Guaidó declared himself the interim president in January of
2019.85 He led several public mobilizations wanting to convince
Venezuelans that he can help lead the country out of its political and
economic crisis.86 Guaidó was backed by fifty-one nations, including
the United States, as the legitimate leader of Venezuela.87 Guaidó, in
front of many Venezuelans, stated “he was ready to assume the
presidency until free and fair elections could be held.”88 Guaidó was
also “briefly detained” by the intelligence services after his
Maduro removed Guaidó’s parliamentary
announcement.89
immunity.90 Venezuelan Supreme Court Justice, Maikel Moreno, called
for Guaidó’s prosecution for inciting violence against the government
and receiving illicit funds.91
The Opposition, under Juan Guaidó and the Democratic United
Roundtable, is demanding the Maduro regime: “participate in free and

84. Id. (finding there were large sections of the Venezuelan population that did not have
access to food distribution, with some interviewees accused the authorities of excluding them
because they were not government supporters).
85. Taylor, supra note 77.
86. Richard Gonzales, Maduro Allies Move Against Rival Juan Guaidó in Venezuela,
NPR (Apr. 2, 2019, 11:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/02/709306132/maduro-allies-moveagainst-rival-juan-guaid-in-venezuela [https://perma.cc/949K-3WJU] (illuminating the threat
Guaidó candidacy was to Maduro’s regime).
87. Taylor, supra note 77 (describing the global response to Guaidó’s declaration to serve
as interim president of Venezuela).
88. Daniels, supra note 35 (recognizing Guaidó’s wanted to ensure Venezuelans that he was
there to bring democracy back not take over the country).
89. Id. (“[Guaidó] was incredibly brave and now runs risks that he’ll be jailed, tortured or
need to go into exile,’ said David Smolansky, an opposition leader . . . .”).
90. Gonzales, supra note 86 (“Venezuela’s Constituent Assembly voted unanimously to
strip self-proclaimed interim president Juan Guaidó of immunity in a move his supporters fear may
signal the impending arrest and prosecution of the opposition leader who is challenging the rule of
President Nicolas Maduro.”).
91. The Latest: Venezuela Judge Seeks to Strip Guaido’s Immunity, AP NEWS (Apr. 1,
2019), https://www.apnews.com/59c558cb8a0a4f01b945bda8f834a7bf [https://perma.cc/TQP3DW4H]. See generally Gonzales, supra note 86 (insinuating Maduro’s allies are creating charges
against Guaidó as a response to his interim presidency).
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fair elections with international oversight and monitoring; allow for
unimpeded humanitarian aid; release hundreds of jailed political leaders
and activists; dismantle the paramilitary colectivos; dissolve the
constituent national assembly; and respect the national assembly.”92
According to the UN, Venezuela will have over 5 million individuals
seeking refuge in other countries by the end of 2019.93 According to the
NGO, over 10,477 protests have taken place in Venezuela since the start
of 2019.94
In April 2019, Guaidó launched “Operation Liberty,” which was a
nationwide protest that asked for members of the military to defeat the
Maduro regime.95 While this protest was unsuccessful, it pushed for
further negotiations between Maduro and the Opposition.96 Guaidó is
pushing for democracy to return to the government, whereas Maduro
continues to assert that he should remain in power over the country.97 As
of November 2019, Maduro has not agreed to any of the proposals the
Guaidó government requested.98

92. Moises Rendon & Mark Schneider, Analyzing Obstacles to Venezuela’s Future, CTR.
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDS. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/analyzingobstacles-venezuelas-future?amp [https://perma.cc/3H3B-XECM] (“By contrast, the Maduro
regime reasserted its desire for its authority to be accepted, argued against any early election, and
requested that the opposition leverage their international connections to eliminate the sanctions
administered by the United States and a few other countries.”).
93. Id. See generally Lockdowns Over, Venezuelans are Fleeing Their Country Once Again,
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 9, 2020, 4:16 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/202010-09/venezuela-migrants-resume-exodus [https://perma.cc/34RB-LGX9] (acknowledging the
number of Venezuelans seeking refuge, as of the beginning of 2020, reached 5 million).
94. Rendon & Schneider, supra note 92 (“Over 4,000 protests have been related to the
provision of basic services. Altogether, there have been dozens of deaths related to the repression
of protestors by the Maduro regime, as well as many others detained and later disappeared.”).
95. E.g., id. (recognizing Guaidó’s failed attempt to force a transition to defect from the
Maduro regime allowed some high-level officials to flee Maduro’s regime).
96. Id. (indicating tensions between Maduro and Guaidó’s talks arose early on due to arrests
of members of Guaidó’s security detail and did not yield a resolution).
97. Id. (stressing Maduro’s refusal to work with Guaidó to accomplish substantial change
for Venezuela and noting Maduro’s plan to “further exploit the suspension of talks to negotiate
with several smaller factions of the opposition.”).
98. Id. (As of now, the Maduro regime has not been willing to accept the proposals set forth
by the Guaidó government, . . . nor has it offered a comprehensive proposal of its own. Ultimately,
these talks w[il] fizzle after the Maduro regime skipped the last round of the talks . . . .).
FOR
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II. ANALYSIS
“If a family member dies, we can’t even bury him with dignity . . .
how can this be our reality?”99
International Criminal Court (ICC) seeks universal participation by
nations in its objective to bring leading perpetrators of genocide, crimes
against humanity, serious war crimes, and aggression to justice.100
Maduro must be held accountable for the horrible and egregious acts he
has committed, for directing his government, military, and police to
commit crimes against fellow Venezuelan citizens, and for his failure to
protect the citizens of Venezuela.101 Maduro and other Venezuelan
authorities committed heinous crimes against Venezuela and its people;
crimes which include murder, rape, torture, and imprisonment.102
The ICC must hold Maduro and his regime accountable and answer for
the crimes they have committed to the innocent citizens of Venezuela.103

99. In Venezuela’s Former Oil Capital, There’s Poverty in Life and Death, INDEP.
(Sept. 24, 2019, 13:59 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/world/venezuela-oilcapital-poverty-life-death-maduro-a9116661.html [https://perma.cc/G228-QT66].
100. Why Back the International Criminal Court and the Fight for Global Justice, COAL.
FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/explore/20-icc-benefits [https://perma.cc/
8GMS-GBA6]; see Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 171,
269–71 (1997) (“Crimes against humanity—inhumane acts or persecutions based on racial,
religious or political grounds—constituted a revolutionary step in the evolution of international
jurisprudence.”).
101. See Andrew Rosati & Jose Enrique Arrioja, Venezuela is Committing Crimes Against
Humanity, OAS Panel Says, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2019, 2:33 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-05-29/oas-panel-accuses-maduro-government-of-crimes-against-humanity
[https://perma.cc/6C7L-DMCX] (“[T]he experts said the socialist regime was involved in multiple
murders and at least 12,000 cases of imprisonment and arbitrary detention. It also accused the
authorities of torture, rape, political persecution and enforced disappearances.”). See generally
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R , supra note 62 (emphasizing the failure
of the government under Maduro’s regime to provide citizens with basic access to food and health).
102. Rosati & Arrioja, supra note 101 (“Maduro’s administration has pursued a ‘massive
assault on the rule of law in Venezuela’ . . . [with] widespread attacks on the
judiciary . . . prevent[ing] any ‘genuine legal proceedings to investigate the crimes against
humanity.’ Manuel Ventura Robles, one of the panelists and a former judge of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights [stated,] . . . “[c]ases of torture against women, men, it’s all
incomprehensible that this continues to occur in our continent.”).
103. See Lippman, supra note 100, at 171 (“The rights of individuals were thus determined
to transcend culture and country borders, and public officials could no longer claim immunity for
the mistreatment of those within their own or other States.”). See generally THE STATE OF
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Specifically, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court allows
the ICC to prosecute Crimes Against Humanity.104 The Office of the
Prosecutor of the ICC began a preliminary investigation into Venezuela
at the beginning of 2018.105 Several protests have occurred across the
country since 2017 and are the result of demands by Venezuelan citizens
to improve the economic and humanitarian crisis.106 The government’s
response to the protests was to impose a policy allowing the excessive
use of force on citizens during protests.107 Between January 21 to
January 25 of 2019, State Security Forces used gunfire to kill thirty-three
people during protests.108 More than 900 people were detained and
approximately 770 people were detained in a single day.109 Between

VENEZUELA, The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect (with Elisabeth Pramendorfer),
(July 31, 2020), https://stateofvenezuela.podbean.com [https://perma.cc/MN3R-GBBN].
104. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002).
105. Preliminary Examinations: Venezuela, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/
venezuela [https://perma.cc/QG5Q-PQH7] (analyzing the crimes committed under Maduro’s
regime since April 2017 with a focus on demonstrations and the related political unrest).
106. Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and U.S. Policy Responses:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, 116th
Cong. 18–19 (2019) (statement by Marcela Escobari, Senior Fellow for Global Economy and
Development) (tracing the protest of Maduro’s regime to the frustration of Venezuelan citizens and
their lack of basic necessities such as food and healthcare); cf. UNHCR, supra note 65 (correlating
Maduro’s regime to the massive exodus in Venezuela).
107. Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and U.S. Policy Responses:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade, 116th
Cong. 29–30 (2019) [Hereinafter Maduro Hearing] (statement from Santiago Canton, Former
Executive Secretary, Inter-Americas Program) https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/
20190226/108946/HHRG-116-FA07-Transcript-20190226.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q95N-TBKE]
(emphasizing Maduro’s goal of eliminating those opposed to his leadership in Venezuela at any
cost by “weaponizing . . . seriously deteriorated living conditions in Venezuela, using [the] little
supplies . . . available to reward those actively loyal to the regime and in turn, withholding
resources as punishment to those who have been deemed their enemy. Food, medicines, and other
basic necessities have become tools of political and social control, weapons with which to persecute
their own people.”).
108. Venezuela: Crimes Against Humanity Require a Vigorous Response From the
International Justice System, AMNESTY INT’L (May 14, 2019, 11:11 AM), https://www.amnesty.
org/en/latest/news/2019/05/venezuela-crimes-against-humanity-require-response-from-internatio
nal-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/ZK4X-6Z9M] (“At least 33 of these people were killed by
state security forces and six were killed by third parties acting with the approval of the authorities
during the demonstrations.”).
109. Id. (emphasizing the pattern of repression by the Maduro administration).
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2014 and 2018, thousands of extrajudicial executions occurred.110 Five
countries referred the Venezuelan case to the Office of the Prosecutor of
the ICC.111
A. International Criminal Court (ICC)
1.

The Rome Statute

The Rome Statute was created so that there is an entity specifically
meant for prosecuting and punishing individuals accused of human rights
violations.112 The Rome Statute was approved in 1998 by 120
countries.113 The court is located in The Hague, Netherlands.114 The
Court came into force on July 1, 2002.115 The Rome Statute allows for
the Court to be completely independent, including prosecutors and
judges, which helps “safeguard against politically motivated
investigations and prosecutions.”116 Cases can be referred to the ICC in
two ways: by national governments or the UN Security Council.117 The
Rome Statute states the jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the
“most serious crimes of concern to the national community as a

110. Maduro Hearing, supra note 107, at 28 (statement from Santiago Canton, Former
Executive Secretary, Inter-Americas Program) (“12,000 arbitrary detentions, 289 cases of torture,
and 192 cases of rape of persons under State control; and a number of enforced disappearances.”);
see also The State of Venezuela, The Challenge of Sharing our Story at Home, Abroad, and on
Campus (With Maria Fernanda Bello), at 45:10–45:29 (July 31, 2020), https://stateofvenezuela.
podbean.com [https://perma.cc/MN3R-GBBN] (“I better run because they will come after me, they
will take me, they will hurt me . . . when you know that the criminals are the only ones allowed to
have guns they will come after you and there is nothing you can do . . . .”).
111. Maduro Hearing, supra note 107, at 29 (statement from Santiago Canton, Former
Executive Secretary, Inter-Americas Program).
112. See generally COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., supra note 100 (highlighting the benefits
of this impartial and independent institution and how it can bring justice to victims of crimes against
humanity).
113. International Criminal Court Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 7, 2020, 3:15 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/18/world/international-criminal-court-fast-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/MY79-6J8W].
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. COAL. FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., supra note 100 (emphasizing the goal of the ICC is to
stand for equality and prevent genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes); cf. Gonzales,
supra note 90 (recognizing the inequities of the biased Venezuelan judicial system favor Maduro).
117. International Criminal Court Fast Facts, supra note 113.
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whole.”118 The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this statute
with respect to the follow crimes: the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crime of aggression.119 There are eighteen
judges on the Court which all serve nine year terms.120
2.

Crimes Against Humanity

Article 7 of the Rome Statute states the following crimes fall under the
crime of “crime against humanity”: “a) Murder; b) Extermination;
c) Enslavement; . . . e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty . . . . f) Torture; g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization . . . . i) Enforced
disappearance of persons; j) Crimes of apartheid; k) Other inhumane
acts . . . intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
to mental or physical health.”121
The Rome Statute is a combination of common law and civil law,
which typically varies by nation, so the ICC is instituted to have
commonality.122 The Rome Statute incorporates a defendant’s due
process rights into the statute in order to have a fair trial.123 Certain
rights given to all defendants include the: “presumption of innocence,
right to counsel, right to present evidence and to confront witnesses, right
to remain silent, right to be present at trial, right to have charged proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, right to an appeal, and protection against
double jeopardy.”124 It is important the ICC has the support of the

118. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl, art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002).
119. See id. (describing how during this century, millions of children, women, and men have
been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity).
120. International Criminal Court Fast Facts, supra note 113.
121. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002).
122. David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 992 (2008) (detailing the vast
majority of nations do not rely on trials by jury and typically only rule by using bench trials).
123. Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15/qa-international-criminal-court-andunited-states [https://perma.cc/K75B-U3GJ] (“The ICC is designed to be an independent
permanent tribunal that respects the highest standards of justice.”).
124. Id.
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international community to send the message to the Maduro regime that
crimes against humanity will not be tolerated.125
3.

International Crimes Being Committed by Venezuela

The Human Rights Council held an independent fact-finding mission
on Venezuela to “investigate extrajudicial executions, enforced
disappearance, arbitrary detentions and torture and other cruel, inhumane
or degrading treatment since 2014 . . . .”126 An “[a]ttack directed against
any civilian population ‘means a course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts . . . against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack.’”127 Crimes being committed by Maduro and other governmental
officials are: (1) murder; (2) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(3) torture; (4) rape; (5) enforced disappearances of persons; and (6) other
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering.128
a.

Murder

The elements under Article 7(1)(a) of murder are:
1) The perpetrator killed one or more persons, 2) the conduct was
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population, and 3) the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part

125. Id.
126. HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, supra note 63, at 2.
127. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002).
128. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl, art. 7(1), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002) (recognizing that such grave crimes threaten
the peace, security and well-being of the world); see also David McKenzie et al., The Women
Fighting to Solve Hundreds of Mysterious Murders in Venezuela, CNN (May 6, 2019, 6:52 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/30/americas/venezuela-special-action-force-faes-accused-deathsintl/index.html [https://perma.cc/6NNR-KT88] (recounting witness testimony of Venezuelan
citizens on the murders and other crimes occurring across the country that are perpetrated by the
Venezuelan government against its citizens). See generally HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, supra note 63,
at 97–196 (providing examples of cases the Human Rights Council analyzed in an independent
fact-finding mission in Venezuela that they concluded involved crimes against humanity).
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of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population.129

Venezuelan special forces have carried out thousands of extrajudicial
killings and then “manipulated crime scenes to make it look as if the
victims had been resisting arrest.”130 The Special Action Forces, tasked
with handling drug trafficking and crime and known as “death squads,”
killed 5,287 people in 2018, but some sources state that number could be
much higher.131 The term Murder is not defined in the Rome Statute.132
The United Nation’s High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR)
stated in a report that murder is considered the “[i]ntentional killing
committed with firearms or other less lethal weapons, unless strictly
unavoidable to protect life, contravenes international standards, and
amounts to excessive use of force, and possibly to an extrajudicial
execution.”133 There have been plenty of reports and statements by
Venezuelan citizens that could be used in an ICC proceeding to show the
crimes committed by Maduro and the Venezuelan government.134
129. Elements of Crimes, INT’L CRIM. CT. 5, 6 (2011) https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7QYP-6BDL].
130. See Nick Cumming-Bruce, Venezuela Forces Killed Thousands, Then Covered it up,
U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/04/world/americas/
venezuela-police-abuses.html [https://perma.cc/J8N4-Y2E7] (citing a U.N. report that found an
attempted cover-up of thousands of extrajudicial killings performed by Venezuelan government
forces); see also, e.g., McKenzie, supra note 128 (“Her son Darwilson was 20 years old when he
was shot just outside their home in Caracas in 2013. Sanchez believes the men who executed him
were members of Venezuela’s police forces.”).
131. E.g., Cumming-Bruce, supra note 130 (“Families of 20 young men who were killed in
the last year described a pattern of violence in which the [Special Action Forces] arrived in pickup
trucks without license plates, dressed in black and with their faces covered by balaclavas.”).
132. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force on July 1, 2002). But see HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, supra note 63 (“The unlawful
and intentional causing of the death of a human being in the context of a widespread or systematic
attack constitutes the crime against humanity of murder.”).
133. Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Context of Protests in the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela From 1 April to 31 July 2017, OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUM. RTS. 33–34 (Aug. 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/HCReport
Venezuela_1April-31July2017_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/64AX-XEGK] (stressing the abuses
perpetrated by the Venezuelan authorities and the need for an international response).
134. See generally Cumming-Bruce, supra note 130 (citing accounts of masked Special
Action Forces units in black trucks who would storm into homes, assault the women, and shoot the
men before staging the scene to look like their victims were criminals); accord McKenzie, supra
note 128 (providing the account of Sanchez, one of many mothers who are victims of these crimes,
and her willingness to start a support organization of other mothers calling for justice); Venezuela:
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b. Imprisonment
The elements under Article 7(1)(e) for imprisonment are:
1) the perpetrator imprisoned one or more persons or otherwise severely
deprived one or more persons of physical liberty, 2) the gravity of the
conduct was such that it was in violation of fundamental rules of
international law, 3) the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances
that established the gravity of the conduct, 4) the conduct was committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population, and 5) the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or
intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population.135

The Venezuelan government has put several political opponents in jail
to completely stop them from running against the Maduro regime.136 In
2018, Venezuelan prisons had more than 230 political prisoners.137
Leopoldo López, Opposition leader, is currently serving a thirteen-year
sentence on charges of inciting violence despite the fact that the Maduro
regime has not presented any credible evidence against him.138
c.

Torture

“Torture” means the “intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the
control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or

‘A Worrying Destabilizing Factor in the Region’, Bachelet Tells Human Rights Council, UN NEWS
(Mar. 20, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1035061 [https://perma.cc/699J-2DHC]
(noting the report of a U.N. rights chief who found patterns of illegal raids conducted by FAES that
similarly resulted in deaths).
135. Elements of Crimes, supra note 129, at 14 ; see, e.g., HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, supra note
63, at 151–163 (summarizing the accounts of Venezuelan citizens who the Human Rights Council
concluded were unfairly treated and imprisoned).
136. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 51 (indicating the level of control the current regime
has on all facets of Venezuelan society, including the ability to restrict the notion of any political
change).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., id. (“The Venezuelan government has jailed political opponents and
disqualified them from running for office . . . despite a lack of credible evidence against them . . . ”
and has forced others into exile).
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suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions.”139
The elements of torture under Article 7(1)(f) are: 1) the perpetrator
inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more
persons, 2) such person or persons were in the custody or under the control
of the perpetrator, 3) such pain and suffering did not arise only from, and
was not inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions, 4) the conduct was
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population, and 5) the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part
of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population.140

Government agents have found any reason to pull people from their
homes, detaining them in order to cause abuses and torture such as
“electric shocks, asphyxiation, and other [torture] techniques.”141 Once
detained, government agents subjected opponents of the government to
abuses ranging from severe beatings to torture involving electric shocks,
asphyxiation, being hung in stress positions, sleep deprivation, and sexual
abuse (including rape).142 Security forces detonated teargas where the
detainees are held and denied them access to food or water.143 One

139. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(e), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002).
140. Elements of Crimes, supra note 129, at 14.
141. Crackdown on Dissent: Brutality, Torture, and Political Persecution in Venezuela,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/11/29/crackdowndissent/brutality-torture-and-political-persecution-venezuela
[https://perma.cc/P4QF-LN7R]
[hereinafter Crackdown on Dissent] (“While Human Rights Watch and the Penal Forum
have . . . been unable to determine the full scope of human rights violations [in Venezuela] . . . our
research shows that the abuses were not isolated cases or the result of excesses by rogue security
force member.”); see, e.g., HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, supra note 63 (“According to the accounts she
received, the most common practice involved hanging the women by their hands, blindfolding them
and beating them all over their bodies, while calling them bitches and other insults. Others received
electric shocks.”).
142. See, e.g., Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 141 (“In 53 cases involving at least 232
people documented in this report, detainees were subjected to physical and psychological abuse,
with the apparent purpose of either punishing them or forcing them to incriminate themselves or
others.”).
143. See generally id. (emphasizing the utter disregard for humanity people in Venezuelan
prisons are shown, including a detailed account of how security forces under direct command from
the Venezuelan government decimate their own population).
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individual reported an incident where they had him handcuffed, tied to a
pipe on the ceiling, and beaten for nine hours straight.144
d. Rape
The elements of rape under Article 7(1)(g)-1 are:
1) the perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the
victim with any object or any other part of the body, 2) the invasion was
committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused
by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse
of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of
a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person
incapable of giving genuine consent, 3) the conduct was committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population,
4) the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct
to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population.145

There are several reports of rape occurring on women detainees,
although there is very little information about how this occurs.146 One
individual, Reny Elias, was arrested at his house and describes “officers
choosing one young man, pulling down his pants in front of the other

144. Cf. UN Signals Possible Executions, Forced Disappearances in Venezuela, AGENCIA
EFE (Aug. 30, 2017, 12:28 PM), https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/un-signals-possibleexecutions-forced-disappearances-in-venezuela/50000262-3365147 [https://perma.cc/PC3P-B6
KJ] (discussing the severe treatment that adults and children were subject to, including: 1) being
burned with cigarettes, 2) forced to listen to pro-government chants, and 3) having chemical
substances, such as tear gas, placed directly in their respiratory tracts, and 4) other atrocities of the
like).
145. Elements of Crimes, supra note 129, at 28.
146. Cf. Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 141 (“[A]nd he heard one officer say, ‘rape that
bitch.’ Although he had his eyes covered, he could hear a woman who was close to him scream
that a member of the GNB was ‘raping her with his fingers.’”); cf. HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, supra note
63 (“Male custodians threatened to rape male detainees with sticks and bats. . . . Male officers told
C2EE01 that a group of them would rape her if she did not provide information. They threatened
to rape her anally and with objects. The officers called her a traitor, a bitch and her mother’s cunt
(coño de su madre).”).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol23/iss3/3

24

Matos: Justice for Venezuela

2021]

JUSTICE FOR VENEZUELA

451

detainees, putting teargas powder and water in his anus, and penetrating
him with a broomstick.”147
e.

Enforced Disappearance of Person

Enforced disappearance of persons means the
arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by
a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information
on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing
them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.148

The United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearance (UNWGEID) reviewed 425 cases for thirty-six
countries.149 It examined forty-nine reported cases of enforced
disappearances using its “urgent action” procedure; recent cases include
eleven countries, one of which is Venezuela.150 Since 2014, more than
12,500 people have been arrested in connection with protests occurring
across the country.151 The arrest of these individuals include not only
demonstrators fighting for the government to return human rights to the
country but also bystanders.152 Approximately 7,000 individuals have
147. Diego Scharifker, Accounts of Brutal Torture Further Isolate Venezuela. But We Need
Justice, WASH. POST (June 6, 2018, 12:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/globalopinions/wp/2018/06/06/accounts-of-brutal-torture-further-isolate-venezuela-but-we-need-justice/
[https://perma.cc/7793-RW5V].
148. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002); Elements of Crimes, supra note 129, at 11; cf.
HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, supra note 63 (“In seven investigated cases, SEBIN officers and other
authorities either denied holding the person or told family members and lawyers that they had no
information. In at least two cases, SEBIN officers told detainees’ mothers they should check the
hospital and the morgue” even though these officers, knew that the detainees were in their custody).
149. Priya Pillai, Enforced Disappearances: A Global Scourge, Increasingly Under the
Radar, OPINIOJURIS (May 31, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/05/31/enforced-disappearancesa-global-scourge-increasingly-under-the-radar/ [https://perma.cc/DG7B-TM3B] (“[E]nforced
disappearances have been carried out in a variety of contexts—internal conflicts and separatist
movements, civil war, and to quell political dissent in ‘normal’ circumstances.”).
150. Id.
151. Venezuela Events of 2018, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2019/country-chapters/venezuela [https://perma.cc/MZ4Q-UXTV].
152. Cf. id. (“Security forces have committed serious abuses against detainees that in some
cases amount to torture . . . . [Nonetheless,] security forces continue repressing spontaneous
protests and carrying out targeted, arbitrary arrests of opponents or perceived opponents throughout
the country.”).
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been “conditionally released,” but many still must return to court for
possible criminal prosecution.153
4.

Individuals Convicted by the ICC

There have been twenty-eight cases prosecuted by the ICC.154 The
following are four of the most influential convictions within the ICC in
other countries.155
a.

Jean Pierre Bemba

Mr. Bemba was accused of three counts of war crimes and two counts
of crimes against humanity for failing to keep his forces from raping and
killing civilians.156 The offenses were all committed between 2002 and
2003 in multiple locations throughout the Central African Republic.157
Bemba’s forces are alleged to have carried out widespread crimes against
the civilian population including mass rapes, killings, and looting.158
This was a landmark case because it was the first time ICC convicted an
individual of rape or of the actions of their troops who committed
153. Id. (suggesting the retention of an individual’s freedom has not stopped previous
prisoners from living in fear that the Venezuelan government will take their life or put them back
in prison for no reason).
154. Trying Individuals for Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, and
Aggression, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases [https://perma.cc/6Q87-EHZM].
155. Cf. Jane Stromseth, Is the ICC Making a Difference?, JUST SEC. (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/47717/icc-making-difference/
[https://perma.cc/QQ67-JM78]
(recognizing the ICC’s importance through landmark convictions help set the position that the ICC
is a force to be reckoned with in terms of providing justice for criminal human atrocities across the
globe).
156. Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., ICC 01/05-01/08, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74
of the Statute, ¶ 742 (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF
[https://perma.cc/88KP-2ATX] (explaining the crimes Bemba committed, is responsible for, and
eventually convicted of). See generally Profile; Jean-Pierre Bemba, DR Congo’s Ex-Rebel and
Vice-President, BBC (June 8, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35845556
[https://perma.cc/G5FV-QFHP] [hereinafter Profile; Jean-Pierre Bemba] (“It was the ensuing
reign of terror, allegedly involving looting, civilian killings and mass rape of hundreds of women
by MLC fighters, which led the ICC to file charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity
against him as the group’s leader.”).
157. Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., ICC 01/05-01/08, at ¶ 742; Profile; Jean-Pierre Bemba,
supra note 156.
158. Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., ICC 01/05-01/08, at ¶¶ 44, 153, 742 (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF
[https://perma.cc/88KP-2ATX];
cf. Profile; Jean-Pierre Bemba, supra note 156 (“In one case, three generations of the same family
were gang-raped while their relatives were forced to watch.”).
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rape.159 Essentially, this set the precedent that a commander can be
found responsible for failing to take actions to stop crimes they know are
being committed by subordinates.160 The Court declared Bemba guilty
on two counts of crimes against humanity and sentenced him to eighteen
years.161 Bemba appealed both his sentences and the verdict, stating he
did not have control over all 1,500 troops.162 In the contested majority
opinion supported by three of the five judges, the Court held the trial court
“erroneously convicted Bemba for specific criminal acts that were
outside the scope of the charges.”163 Bemba was also charged with and
unsuccessfully appealed his conviction for presenting false evidence and
corruptly influencing witnesses to not testify or testify falsely during his
trial.164 Bemba only received a one year suspended sentence and was
fined 300,000 euros.165
b. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui
Katanga and Chui were accused of three counts of crimes against
humanity and seven counts of war crimes.166 The charge of war crimes
was due to using children under the age of fifteen to take part in
hostilities, directing an attack against civilians, willful killing, destruction
159. Jean-Pierre Bemba’s War Crimes Conviction Overturned, THE GUARDIAN (June 8,
2019, 12:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/08/former-congoleader-jean-pierre-bemba-wins-war-crimes-appeal-international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/
87WG-3UMQ].
160. Id.
161. Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., ICC 01/05-01/08, at ¶ 742; Profile; Jean-Pierre Bemba,
supra note 156.
162. Jean-Pierre Bemba’s War Crimes Conviction Overturned, supra note 159.
163. ICC Appeals Chamber Acquits Mr. Bemba from Charges of War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, INT’L CRIM. CT. (June 8, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?
name=pr1390 [https://perma.cc/AZ6X-LG34]; Jean-Pierre Bemba’s War Crimes Conviction
Overturned, supra note 159.
164. Profile; Jean-Pierre Bemba, supra note 156.
165. Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC 01/05-1/08, Case Information Sheet, https://www.icccpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/BembaEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EJE-RFL9] (last updated Mar.
2019).
166. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui At the International Criminal Court,
INT’L JUST. MONITOR (July 29, 2020), https://www.ijmonitor.org/category/germain-katanga-andmathieu-ngudjolo-chui/ [https://perma.cc/9BWM-XJ4E] (“Congolese warlords Germain
Katanga, . . . and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,” were charged by the ICC because: (1) of an attack the
two warlords were connected to in a Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) village (2) the DRC
became a state party to the Rome Statute; and (3) the DRC proved to be unwilling or unable to
prosecute the crimes after when they chose to refer the situation to the ICC in 2004).
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of property, pillaging, sexual slavery, and rape.167 Initially Katanga and
Ngudjolo’s trials were tried together.168 The Court said they did this
particularly on the basis that Katanga and Ngudjolo shared responsibility
for crimes committed during a joint attack on the village of Bogoro.169
Eventually, the Court decided the liability applicable to Katanga required
more time whereas, Ngudholo’s judgment should not be delayed.170
Only Katanga was found guilty “as an accessory to one [count of a] crime
against humanity (murder) and four [counts of] war crimes (murder,
attacking a civilian population, destruction of property and
pillaging).”171 In 2012, Ngudjolo was acquitted of all charges due to
insufficient evidence.172 Katanga was sentenced to twelve years in
prison.173 The majority concluded Katanga made a significant
contribution to the crimes committed and knew the combatants intended
to commit crimes during the attack.174 However, the majority found
there was insufficient evidence to find Katanga guilty of using child
soldiers in the hostilities, rape, and sexual slavery.175 Katanga’s 12-year
sentence was reduced by the almost seven years he spent in ICC detention

167. Id. (noting the ICC’s investigation of the warlords’ actions revealed sufficient evidence
to suggest attacks on civilians were due to their ethnicity).
168. Id.
169. Id. (“All the evidence for these crimes related to both suspects. The joinder was
deemed in the interests of the victims and witnesses, conducting the proceedings in a fair and
efficient manner, and the protection of the rights of the defendants, including the right to be tried
without undue delay.”).
170. Id. (“The majority recognized that these changes would prolong the trial of Katanga
and decided that it was unnecessary to delay the judgment in the case of Ngudjolo.”).
171. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Case Information Sheet (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/KatangaEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9XK-9UWJ];
Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, supra note 166.
172. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, supra note 166 (“[ICC] judges found that there was a lack
of credible evidence provided by the prosecution to support the accusation, and testimony from key
prosecution witnesses lacked sufficient credibility to prove Ngudjolo was the commander of the
combatants” and, thus, could not link him to the actions of soldiers).
173. Id.
174. Id. (“Katanga knew the combatants intended to commit crimes during the attack and
drew attention to the importance of the firearms in the attack. Katanga furnished weapons to local
combatants in large quantities, which allowed the combatants to successfully take Bogoro in a
matter of hours.”).
175. Id.
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and later subsequently reduced by 3 years and 8 months from a review
panel.176
c.

Thomas Lubanga

Lubanga is accused of conscripting and enlisting children under the
age of fifteen—child soldiers—”and using them to participate actively in
hostilities.”177 These crimes were committed between September 2002
and August 2003.178 During the trial, for the first time in ICC history,
victims—118 in Lubanga’s trial—were able to give their testimony
during the proceedings.179 The trial took three years.180 The Court held
the prosecutor had proven beyond reasonable doubt that Lubanga was
guilty of conscription.181 Lubanga was convicted and sentenced to
fourteen years.182 He is the first person to be convicted and sentenced
by the ICC.183 Both Lubanga and the prosecutor filed appeals for the

176. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement on the appeals against the order
of Trial Chamber II of 24 March 2017 entitled “Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the
Statute”, ¶ 260 (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_01651.PDF
[https://perma.cc/E9VV-GVMU] (“On 23 May 2014, Trial Chamber II sentenced Mr[.] Katanga to
12 years of imprisonment. On 4 May 2015, Mr[.] Katanga indicated that he strongly desired to
serve the remainder of his sentence in the DRC and requested the Presidency’s assistance in
pursuing this possibility. Mr[.] Katanga re-iterated his desire to be transferred to the DRC on 20
October 2015. On 13 November 2015, the Appeals Chamber reduced his sentence by 3 years and
8 months and set the date for the completion of his sentence to 18 January 2016.”).
177. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Case Information Sheet (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/LubangaEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX99-VY5X].
178. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, TRIAL INT’L (July 6, 2016), https://trialinternational.org/latest
-post/thomas-lubanga-dyilo/ [https://perma.cc/5F9S-73JR].
179. Id. (“This decision, which allows victims to participate from the very beginning of the
investigation, constitutes an important development with respect to the role of the victims of
breaches of international criminal law in such proceedings. Neither the International Criminal
Tribunals for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia, nor the Special Court for Sierra Leone
allowed for such forms of participation by victims. The proceedings against Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo allow, for the very first time, the possibility for victims of international crimes to explain
their views and concerns to the Court, where their personal interests are at stake.”).
180. Id.
181. Id.; Conscription, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The compulsory
enlistment of persons into military service.”).
182. David Smith, Thomas Lubanga Sentenced to 14 Years for Congo War Crimes,
THE GUARDIAN (July 10, 2012, 5:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/jul/10/iccsentences-thomas-lubanga-14-years [https://perma.cc/9AMR-HW7Z].
183. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

29

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 23 [2021], No. 3, Art. 3

456

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 23:427

verdict and sentencing.184 As of December 2014, the appeals confirmed
the guilty verdict as well as the sentencing of fourteen years.185 The
appeals chamber also quashed the decision of Lubanga having to be held
personally liable for the collective reparations due to the fact the
prosecutor failed to prove direct harm was suffered by the victims as a
result of Lubanga’s crimes.186
d. Ahmad al-Faqi Al Mahdi
Ahmad, a member of Malian Jihadist organization, was convicted of
the war crime of “intentionally directing attacks against ten buildings of
a religious and historic character in Timbuktu, Mali” in 2012.187
Essentially, this is a conviction for intentionally targeting cultural
heritage.188 This is the first conviction for intentionally directing attacks
on buildings of cultural heritage.189 Al Mahdi lead others to “attack and
destroy” an important cultural site known as “Timbuktu.”190 Ahmad
physically took part in the destruction of at least five sites.191 The
prosecutor charged Al Mahdi with one count of the war crime of attacking
protected objects.192 The prosecutor and Al Mahdi reached a plea
184. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 178 (“The legal representatives of the victims also
appealed the judgement.”).
185. Id. (“[T]he appeals chamber, by a majority decision of the five sitting judges,
confirmed the guilty verdict against Lubanga . . . .”).
186. Id. (“The Chamber specified that the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) could advance its
resources to implement the decision to benefit of the victims, and would be able to claim back its
resources from Lubanaga. . . . As the link between Lubanga’s crimes and the harm suffered by the
victims of SGBV was not proven, the latter could not benefit from reparations. Nevertheless, the
Chamber recalled that the TFV could decide to compensate those victims on the basis of its
discretionary assistance mandate.”).
187. Recent Case, International Criminal Law—Roman Statute—International Criminal
Court Imposes First Sentence for War Crime of Attacking Cultural Heritage—Prosecutor v. Ahmad
Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1978, 1978 (2017).
188. Id. at 1978−79 (“The ICC’s reluctance to define the scope of the Rome Statute’s
protection for cultural heritage more broadly, or alternatively to sound the alarm regarding certain
inadequacies in its coverage, renders the symbolic and precedential value of the case less potent
than it might have been.”).
189. Id. ([Al Mahdi’s] conviction for the sole crime of intentionally targeting cultural
heritage—the first of its kind by the ICC—has rightly been lauded as a victory for the court and for
cultural heritage law . . . .”).
190. Id. (“Al Mahdi was present at all ten attacks, often providing instructions and tools to
assailants and making statements to journalists . . . .”).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1978, 1980.
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agreement, and the Court accepted his admission of guilt and sentenced
him.193 Ahmad was sentenced to nine years in prison after pleading
guilty to war crimes for destroying religious and historic monuments in
the ancient city of Timbuktu, Mali.194 The court issued a reparations
order finding Al Mahdi liable for 2.7 million euros in expenses for
individual and collective reparations for the community of Timbuktu.195
5.

Rules of Evidence in the Rome Statute

The Rules of Evidence for the Rome Statute were an adoption of rules
that declared how pieces of evidence are to be admitted into the ICC.196
The rules have many similar attributes to those of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in the United States.197 Procedural requirements are set forth
in Articles 53–61 of the Rome Statute and the principles governing ICC
trials are in Articles 62–76.198 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence
enforce all the provisions in the Rome Statute.199 Parties may submit
evidence relevant to the case.200 The court shall have the authority to
193. Id. at 1978–79 (“The Court and AL Mahdi reached a plea agreement in February 2016,
and [Al Mahdi]’s subsequent admission of guilt at trial . . . marked the first guilty plea at the ICC.”).
194. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 109 (Sept. 27,
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2016_07244.pdf [https://perma.cc/EUN2-QEDE].
195. Al Mahdi case: ICC Trial Chamber VIII Issues Reparations Order, INT’L CRIM. CT.
(Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1329 [https://perma.cc/U7NC7HK8] (“[The] Trial Chamber VIII also stressed that reparations in the present case are designed—
to the extent achievable—to relieve the suffering caused by the serious crime committed and enable
victims to recover their dignity and deter future violations. . . . The Chamber highlighted the
importance of cultural heritage and stressed that, because of their purpose and symbolism, most
cultural property and cultural heritage are unique and of sentimental value. . . . [Thus,] [t]he
Chamber ordered reparations for three categories of harm: damage to the attacked historic and
religious buildings, consequential economic loss, and moral harm.”).
196. See generally Rules of Procedure and Evidence, INT’L CRIM. CT. (2013),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/Documents/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/8SJJ-88GF] (outlining the various rules and procedures adhered to in ICC cases).
197. See generally id. (elaborating on the procedural rules of evidence utilized by the ICC).
198. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 53–76, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002); Scheffer & Cox, supra note 122, at 996; Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 196.
199. Compare Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 53–76, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002) (remarking on the powers, limits, and
expansive set of guidelines encompassed in the Rome Statute), with Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, supra note 196 (clarifying the Rules of Procedure and Evidence expand on the procedural
requirements of Parts four and five of the Rome Statute).
200. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(3), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002).
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request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the
determination of the truth.201 The Court may rule on the relevance of
any evidence while considering the “probative value of the evidence and
any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or to a fair
evaluation of the testimony of a witness . . . .”202 When deciding on the
relevance or admissibility of evidence collected by a State, the Court shall
not rule on the application of the State’s national law.203
Currently, the ICC has started a preliminary investigation into
Venezuela.204 During the preliminary investigation, Office of the
Prosecutor must determine whether there is sufficient evidence of each
crime.205 The Prosecutor focuses on whether “an investigation would
serve the interests of justice and of the victims.”206 Once the prosecutor
has determined that the crimes are under their jurisdiction and the
requirements have been met, the office will then request an arrest warrant
or summons to appear from a ICC judge.207 Once the suspect gets to
The Hague, there is an initial appearance in front of three judges that
confirm the suspect’s identity and ensure they understand the charges
being brought against them.208 Following the initial appearance, there is
a confirmation of charges hearings that allows the prosecution, the
defense, and the legal representative of victims to speak.209 The judges
then decide if there is enough evidence to go to trial.210 At trial, there
are three judges that determine if the prosecutor has proved beyond a

201. Id.
202. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(4), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002).
203. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(8), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002).
204. Preliminary Examinations: Venezuela, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/
venezuela [https://perma.cc/QG5Q-PQH7] (stating the focus of the preliminary investigation is on
allegations the State’s security forces used excessive force in the context of demonstrations and
related political unrest).
205. How the Court Works, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-courtworks [https://perma.cc/M3LQ-7TXF].
206. Id. (clarifying the ICC only intends to complement, not replace, national criminal
systems and will only prosecute cases when countries are unwilling or unable to do so).
207. Id. (“Pre-Trial Judges issue warrants of arrest and ensure there is enough
evidence . . . .”).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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reasonable doubt the suspect is guilty.211 The judge then considers all
evidence and issues a verdict, which, if the suspect is found guilty, may
include a sentence for up to life in prison.212 Judges can also order
reparations for the victims.213 While the process of this is similar to that
of a criminal bench trial in the United States, there are some slight
differences.214 Venezuela is a party to the Rome Statute and would
therefore be subject to their jurisdiction.215 The judges would only have
to determine if the crimes that have been committed—since 2014—in
Venezuela amount to their definition of crimes against humanity.216
B. Venezuela and the Rome Statute
1.

Who’s Committing These Crimes

There are a multitude of groups in the Venezuelan government that fall
under the term security forces.217 The Bolivarian National Guard’s
211. Scheffer & Cox, supra note 122, at 1048 (“The major differences from common law
procedure in the ICC are the use of a factfinding panel of three Judges instead of a jury, with a
verdict to be rendered by the vote of at least two Judges . . . .”); cf. How the Court Works, supra
note 205 (“If a case is closed without a verdict of guilt, it can be reopened if the Prosecutor presents
new evidence.”).
212. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, 77(1)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002) (“A term of life imprisonment” is permissible for
war crimes; crimes against humanity; crimes of genocide; and crimes of aggression); How the Court
Works, supra note 205.
213. How the Court Works, supra note 205. See generally Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 75, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (listing the different types of reparations
that may be given by the court post-sentencing such as restitution, compensation, and
rehabilitation).
214. Compare How the Court Works, supra note 205 (explaining how the ICC’s legal
process functions differently than the United States national jurisdiction and highlighting the key
components of the ICC process), with Criminal Procedure, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/criminal_procedure [https://perma.cc/F7PY-7CX7] (reviewing
the rules and procedures behind the U.S. criminal bench trial process).
215. See generally The State Parties to The Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%2
0statute.aspx [https://perma.cc/56CE-2JVQ] (listing the 123 countries—under the jurisdiction of
the ICC—who are parties to the Rome Statute); see generally How the Court Works, supra note
205 (“States Parties support the Court, accept the ICC’s jurisdiction, and also work to incorporate
the rules stipulated in the Rome Statute into their own judicial systems.”).
216. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002).
217. See generally Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 141 (identifying the different
organizations within the “Venezuelan Security Forces”; such organizations include the: GNB,
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(Guardia Nacional Bolivariana, GNB) primary responsibility is
“conducting required operations to ensure internal order of the
country.”218 The General Direction of Military Counterintelligence’s
(Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar, DGCIM) purpose is to
coordinate and execute any activities required to stop “enemy activity,”
as well as contribute to the security of the Armed Forces and the
president.219 The National Bolivarian Police (PNB), State and
Municipal police, and Scientific, Penal, and Criminal Investigative Police
(CICPC) are all in charge of public security and the investigation of
crimes throughout the country.220 Most importantly, the “Colectivos”—
a pro-government “gang”—are the ones typically attacking protestors
and anyone they believe to be an opponent of the government and
Maduro.221 Often times, the Colectivos can be wrong about individuals,
but because they aren’t an official organization of the government they
are typically never held responsible.222 The Colectivos collaborate with
the other government organizations even though they are typically made
up of citizens committing violent acts against other citizens.223 Often
times they will detain citizens before turning them over to the other
DGCIM, PNB, CONAS, State and Municipal Police, CICPC, SEBIN, and Colectivos—who work
in tandem with the corrupt Venezuelan government).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.; see Patricia Torres & Nicholas Casey, Armed Civilian Bands in Venezuela Prop
up Unpopular President, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/world
/americas/armed-civilian-bands-in-venezuela-prop-up-unpopular-president.html [https://perma.cc/
6HYW-Q32A] (“Colectivos control vast territory across Venezuela, financed in some cases by
extortion, black-market food and parts of the drug trade as the government turns a blind eye in
exchange for loyalty.”).
222. Patricia Torres & Nicholas Casey, Armed Civilian Bands in Venezuela Prop up
Unpopular President, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/world
/americas/armed-civilian-bands-in-venezuela-prop-up-unpopular-president.html [https://perma.cc/
6HYW-Q32A] (“[Colectivo members re armed by the Venezuelan government . . . [and a]s rising
foreign debt and falling world oil prices . . . deplete[] the Venezuelan government’s coffers, it has
increasingly turned to Colectivos as enforcers. . . . [C]olectivos are appearing almost anywhere the
government sees citizens getting out of line.”).
223. See, e.g., Patricia Torres & Nicholas Casey, Armed Civilian Bands in Venezuela Prop
up Unpopular President, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/world
/americas/armed-civilian-bands-in-venezuela-prop-up-unpopular-president.html [https://perma.cc/
6HYW-Q32A] (Maduro has . . . sen[t] National Guardsmen armed with water cannons and rubber
bullets to disperse [protesting] crowds. But alongside the security forces, experts and witnesses
say, are the enforcers from the Colectivos, who engage in fiercer and often deadly intimidation.”).
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security forces organizations to which there is no telling what kind of
torture and other inhumane acts are being done to these individuals.224
2.

How the ICC Can Help Bring Justice to Venezuela

The ICC generally only exercises its jurisdiction when a country is
either unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute these crimes in
order to give states the opportunity to prosecute on their own first.225
While the ICC cannot try organizations or governments, they should be
able to effectively investigate Maduro and other members
individually.226 Venezuela was one of sixty states that ratified the Rome
Statute in July 2002.227 In 2018, six governments requested the ICC
open an investigation in Venezuela.228 These states include Argentina,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru.229 The preliminary

224. Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 141 (reporting documented abuses initiated by the
Colectivos and cases showing their illegal detainment of Venezuelan citizens).
225. Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Sept. 2, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15/qa-international-criminal-courtand-united-states [https://perma.cc/K75B-U3GJ] (“Even after an [ICC] investigation is opened,
there are opportunities for states and individual defendants to challenge the lawfulness of cases
before the court based on the existence of national proceedings.”).
226. How the ICC Works, A.B.A., https://how-the-icc-works.aba-icc.org [https://perma.cc/
EX3P-G3BD] (“The ICC can only investigate and prosecute “natural persons” who are over the
age of 18. The ICC cannot investigate or prosecute governments, corporations, political parties, or
rebel movements, but may investigate individuals who are members of groups.”); see David
Adams, Venezuela Facing Unprecedented Accusations of Crimes Against Humanity, UNIVISION
(Aug. 27, 2018, 2:38 AM), https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/venezuelafacing-unprecedented-accusations-of-crimes-against-humanity [https://perma.cc/N2XW-9KXW]
(analyzing Maduro’s potential liability to the ICC as “evidence of abuses” continues to: 1) gather
momentum; and 2) show disparities and injustices occurring in Venezuela under his presidency
and, at times, at his direct authority).
227. David Adams, supra note 226.
228. Venezuela: Six States Request ICC Investigation, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 26, 2018,
12:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/26/venezuela-six-states-request-icc-investigation
[https://perma.cc/6KRR-CA7W] (This is the first time that ICC member governments have sought
an investigation of potential crimes that took place entirely on the territory of another country.
“This unprecedented step reflects the growing alarm among other countries about the human rights
catastrophe that has overtaken Venezuela . . . .”); David Adams, supra note 226 (“No country—
let alone a group of countries—has ever brought a case against another country in ICC[’s twentyyear] history . . . .”).
229. Venezuela: Six States Request ICC Investigation, supra note 228 (outlining the
countries, some not even directly surrounding Venezuela, who are speaking out against the
injustices Venezuelan citizens are facing).
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investigation was announced on February 8, 2018.230 The prosecutor
has to first analyze whether crimes specified in the ICC treaty have been
committed then see if they merit the court’s attention.231 Unfortunately,
the investigation could take as little as a few months to as much as a
decade before reaching a decision.232 Venezuelan officials have not
taken any steps to prevent abuses; if anything, they are continuing to
downplay the abuses and continue to implement even greater use of force
on their citizens.233
3.

Amendments Needed for Venezuelan Constitution

Venezuela’s 1961 constitution was designed to be antiauthoritarian.234 The Venezuelan 1961 constitution had separation of
powers with a legislature, Supreme Court, and the President, similar to
that of the United States.235 When Chavez was elected, on his first day
in office he claimed “the people through a referendum, could overthrow
an existing constitution,” which was nowhere in the constitution at the
time.236 Throughout Chavez and Maduro’s terms as presidents they

230. INT’L CRIM. CT., supra note 204; Venezuela: Six States Request ICC Investigation,
supra note 228.
231. INT’L CRIM. CT., supra note 204 (recognizing the prosecutor, pursuant to Article 14 of
the Statute of the ICC, is tasked with determining if: 1) the alleged actions violate the ICC statutes;
and 2) the actions investigation merit court action); see Venezuela: Six States Request ICC
Investigation, supra note 228 (“[T]he prosecutor faces a high threshold. Her current preliminary
inquiry will analyze whether crimes specified in the ICC treaty have been committed; whether those
crimes are sufficiently grave to merit the court’s attention; and whether national authorities are
genuinely carrying out credible investigations and, if appropriate, prosecutions of the cases under
ICC consideration.”).
232. David Adams, supra note 226.
233. Venezuela: Six States Request ICC Investigation, supra note 228.
234. Diego A. Zambrano, The Constitutional Path to Dictatorship in Venezuela, LAWFARE
(Mar. 18, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/constitutional-path-dictatorshipvenezuela [https://perma.cc/2CGK-87U2].
235. Id. (highlighting the similarities between the constitution of Venezuela and the United
States, and, noting, “[u]like the U.S. constitution . . . the Venezuelan constitution . . . prohibit[s]
immediate presidential re-election . . . ” unless the Venezuelan Congress’ exclusive role permitted
such actions).
236. See id. (“[I]mmediate re-election prohibition was seen as a wall against would bedictators” because Venezuelan “president[s] had almost no role in the process [to allow immediate
re-election] and w[ere] indeed explicitly prohibited from opposing amendments. . . .).
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slowly stripped the power of the people away, such as increasing the
years in a presidential term.237
The Supreme Court of Venezuela made a decision that there is a
possibility of calling a referendum in order to determine the popular
opinion regarding an election of a constituent assembly.238 A
referendum was then held in April of 1999 with 81.9% voting yes and
18.1% voting no, which started the process of the Constituent
Assembly.239 In July 1999, an election was held to elect 131 individuals
to the Constituent Assembly.240 President Chavez’s party won an
overwhelming majority of the seats at ninety-five percent.241 In August
of 1999, the Constituent Assembly, with many of Chavez’s supporters,
created a “Commission of Judicial Emergency” aimed at being able to
intervene in certain judicial matters when needed.242 The Constituent
Assembly immediately began chipping away at the Senate and the
Legislative Assemblies of the States.243 The Supreme Court upheld
these actions by the Constituent Assembly.244 In September 1999, the

237. Id. (describing the multiple steps taken by both Chavez and Maduro to not only
undermine the intentions set forth by the 1961 Venezuelan Constitution, but to also extend their
terms of presidency well beyond the prescribed ten-year term limits). See generally BOLIVARIAN
REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA CONSTITUTION of 1999 (rev. 2009), translated in
CONSTITUTEPROJECT.ORG, VENEZUELA (BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF)’S CONSTITUTION OF 1999
WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2009 (Jefri J. Ruchti trans., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. trans.,
2020), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Venezuela_2009.pdf?lang=en [https://perma
.cc/Y22G-UBG8 ] (showing amendments to the Venezuelan Constitution and its effect on the
change of power throughout Chavez and Maduro’s presidential terms).
238. Constitutional History of Venezuela, CONSTITUTIONNET, http://constitutionnet.org/
country/constitutional-history-venezuela [https://perma.cc/6T75-25UQ].
239. Id. (“On February 2, 1999, Chávez issued his first decree as President ordering a
consultative referendum to ask the Venezuelan people whether a constituent assembly should be
convened. The referendum was held on April 25, 1999. 38.7% of eligible voters participated . . . .
With this mandate, the work of convening a constituent assembly began.”).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. (noting the newly elected Constituent Assembly was determined to begin the
deconstruction of judicial processes already in place in order to further the reconstruction of a new
constitution in Venezuela without the legislature).
243. Id. (discussing how Chavez’s actions were the beginning of the dissolution of the antiauthoritarian government set forth in the 1961 Venezuelan constitution and would pave the way for
more drastic changes).
244. Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court upheld the Constituent Assembly’s actions by recognizing
the Constituent Assembly as a “supra constitutional power”. Later, the Constituent Assembly
would use its “supra constitutional power” to suspend judges and replace the Court.”).
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Constituent Assembly began drafting a new constitution that would give
more power to Chavez.245 President Chavez submitted a document that
was prepared with the help of a Constitutional Council composed of
independent political leaders.246 The Constitutional Commission had
only two weeks to integrate almost 800 articles, which left little room for
public discussion and civil society participation.247 In December 1999,
44.3% of eligible voters casted their vote for the new constitution and
71.8% of voters approved it.248 The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution had
350 articles, making it one of the longest, most complicated, and most
comprehensive constitutions in the world.249 Many of the changes in the
constitution related to the structure of the government.250 It converted
Venezuela’s three-branch system of government to a five-branch
government.251 As well as changing the legislative branch from
bicameral to unicameral.252 The constitution also reformed the
presidency by increasing the presidential term from five to six years and
gave Chavez the most power of any president in Latin American
countries.253 President Chavez now had the power to dissolve the
National Assembly.254
Constitutional reform in 2009 further
strengthened the presidency in Venezuela as fifty-four percent of
Venezuelan voters backed a constitutional amendment that abolished
term limits for the president.255

245. See id. (detailing the timeline of the Constituent Assembly’s actions).
246. Id.
247. Id. (describing the steps made by the Constituent Assembly to ensure there was no
change of public intervention. In doing so, the Board of Directors of the Constituent Assembly
assured that the changes Chavez wished to enact took effect).
248. Id. (“The National Election Council audited the vote. The new constitution therefore
replaced the 1961 Constitution, becoming Venezuela’s 26th Constitution and the first constitution
in the history of Venezuela to be approved by popular referendum.”).
249. Id.
250. Id. (evaluating the changes that occurred with the new Constitution and the overall
impact it would have on Venezuela).
251. Id. (outlining the adoption of the five-branch governmental system and distinguishing
it from the previous three-branch system.).
252. See id. (discussing how the rights of the Venezuelan citizens were altered by the 1999
Constitution).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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Freedom of Expression

More than 13,100 people have been arrested in connection with antigovernment protests.256 This wide spread ban on protest needs to be
stopped as it is vital to a democracy and shows the government that the
Venezuelan citizens are only attempting to bring light to atrocities
occurring in the country.257 In 2017, the Venezuelan government put a
ban on protests that could “disturb or affect” the election of that year—
which was highly contested as an illegitimate election.258 The
government stated people could be sentenced to prison for anywhere
between five and ten years.259 The government is not even following
through with the prison sentence as the security forces are killing
individuals involved in any protest-related incidents.260

256. Venezuela: Arrests, Killings in Anti-Government Protest Reports of Violent Abuses by
Security Forces, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 25, 2019, 7:20 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/
01/25/venezuela-arrests-killings-anti-government-protests [https://perma.cc/Y8K8-RFMG].
257. Cf. Constitutional History of Venezuela, supra note 238 (“The 1999 Constitution
incorporated the idea of popular sovereignty (such as frequent referendums), social responsibilities,
the right to rebel against injustice, and the eternal independence of the republic from foreign
domination. Further, it enshrined certain human rights such as . . . the rights for minorities
(including indigenous people), to uphold their own cultures, religions, and languages”; Yet, by
suppressing these rights, particularly the right to rebel against injustice, the Venezuelan government
is violating the very Constitution they put into place.); see also Venezuela: Arrests, Killings in AntiGovernment Protest Reports of Violent Abuses by Security Forces, supra note 256 (condemning
the widespread abuses by members of the security forces in Venezuela and calling for individuals
to help reclaim and restore constitutional order to Venezuela).
258. Venezuela Crisis: Bans on Protest that ‘Disturb’ Election, BBC (July 28, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40744851
[https://perma.cc/77DB-GTAF]
(“National meetings and demonstrations, concentrations of people and any other similar act that
may disturb or affect the normal development of the electoral process are prohibited throughout the
country . . . .”).
259. Id. (commenting on the ever-increasing violent Venezuelan citizens faced and noting
more than 100 individuals reported as killed due to violence related to the protests).
260. See, e.g., Venezuela: Arrests, Killings in Anti-Government Protest Reports of Violent
Abuses by Security Forces, supra note 256 (“On January 23, 2019, Venezuelan security forces used
force to disperse massive anti-government demonstrations. . . . Venezuelan media outlets and civil
society groups reported 26 people killed, use of teargas by security agents against demonstrators,
and 364 people detained. Security forces have also allegedly attacked and detained several
journalists covering the protests.”); see also Venezuela Crisis: Bans on Protest that ‘Disturb’
Election, supra note 258 (“The situation has worsened to the point that the United States has
ordered family members living at the embassy in Caracas to evacuate the country. It also authorized
its staff members to leave if they desire.”).
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b. Freedom of the Press
The government has abused its power by over regulating the media and
working to reduce the number of media outlets that disagree with the
presidency and its administration.261 The government can suspend or
revoke media stories or outlets for any reason they see fit due to the broad
regulations to media, but many self-censor due to fear of harassment.262
Because of this, very few newspapers, websites, and radio stations
criticize the government.263 In 2017, Venezuela’s new Constituent
Assembly, which supports Maduro and his administration, granted itself
the power to write and pass legislation and to supersede the country’s
legislature, the National Assembly, which essentially handed Maduro the
Power he so desperately wanted.264 This allows the Constituent
Assembly to supersede the country’s legislature and the National
Assembly which has been led by the Opposition party for a few years.265
At this point, Maduro secured all the power he needed in the government
—many countries consider Venezuela to now be a dictatorship.266

261. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 151 (“The government can suspend or revoke
concessions to private media if ‘convenient for the interest of the nation,’ arbitrarily suspend
websites for the vaguely defined offense of ‘incitement,’ and criminalize expression of ‘disrespect’
for high government officials.”).
262. Id.; see, e.g., Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact Finding Mission
on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, HUM. RTS. COUNCIL (Sept. 15, 2020)
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFMV/A_HRC_45_CRP.11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W454-WMLB] (“Inés González . . . a chemist and professor, was detained
without a warrant by SEBIN in Maracaibo on 4 October 2014, for publishing derogatory comments
about Mr. Serra after his death.”).
263. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 151.
264. Nicholas Casey, Venezuela’s New, Powerful Assembly Takes Over Legislature’s
Duties, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/world/americas/
venezuela-constituent-assembly-maduro.html
[https://perma.cc/UK44-G28C]
(discussing
Maduro’s illegitimate victory stemmed from disallowing Venezuelans to oppose the Constituent
Assembly and packing the ballot with individuals handpicked from his closest allies and
supporters).
265. Id. (explaining the steps taken to enable the Constituent Assembly to control the five
branches of government in Venezuela was finalized by usurping control from the National
Assembly, allowing Maduro to finally achieve control over all five branches of government and
making it easier for individuals in his position to rewrite laws and remain in power long after the
term limits were finished).
266. Id. (describing the shift in power from legislature to Maduro after he consolidated his
power and his impact on how the world views Venezuela).
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The Venezuelan government closed forty radio stations in 2017.267
Since 2013, three-quarters of the country’s newspapers have closed.268
One of Venezuela’s last anti-government newspaper closed and blamed
the government for restricting the supply of newsprint.269 Physical
threats to journalists have increased since the implementation of these
restrictions on the Media.270 During the first four months of 2017, there
were more than 200 attacks on reporters.271 Journalists are even being
detained by government authorities and have repeatedly been subjected
to harassment and violence, which is leading many to leave the
country.272 That’s just for journalists that are there, but foreign reporters

267. See Angus Berwick & Vivian Sequera, Venezuelan Newspaper Closures Leave
Coverage in State’s Hands, REUTERS (July 26, 2018, 5:07 AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/usvenezuela-media-coverage/venezuelan-newspaper-closures-leave-coverage-in-states-hands-idUS
KBN1KG18G [https://perma.cc/NFH3-M6VJ] (“According to the Venezuela’s Press
institute, . . . [the] radio stations [were closed due to] citing irregularities in their licenses.
Maduro’s government says it treats all media outlets equally and there is freedom of expression.
However, it has publicly said it wants more control over the media . . . .”); see also Jon Allsop,
Venezuela’s War on the Press, COLUM. J. REV. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/
the_media_today/venezuela_crisis_maduro_trump.php
[https://perma.cc/E5AG-W5J4]
(admonishing the Venezuelan government over its impact in the disappearance and infringement
of Venezuela’s independent press).
268. See generally Berwick & Sequera, supra note 267 (describing how the five-year
recession closed nearly all of Venezuela’s newspaper leaving El Nacional as the last independent
national daily newspaper); see also Allsop, supra note 267 (noting since three-quarters of
Venezuela’s newspapers closed in 2013, El Nacional is Venezuela’s last nationally circulated antigovernment newspaper).
269. See, e.g., Venezuela’s Last Nationally Circulated Anti-Government Newspaper Closes,
NPR (Dec. 17, 2018, 4:27 PM) https://www.npr.org/2018/12/17/677511273/venezuelas-lastnationally-circulated-anti-government-newspaper-closes [https://perma.cc/4JC4-8VMD] (citing
an interview with Jorge Makriniotis, general manager of El Nacional, where he described how the
Venezuelan government has stopped selling paper to the newspaper and how they now have to buy
paper on the black market); Allsop, supra note 267 (explaining the Venezuelan government has not
only restricted the paper supply but has also place blockages on online news publications).
270. Allsop, supra note 267.
271. Id.
272. See Journalists Detained, Attacked, and Threatened Amid Unrest in Venezuela,
COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (July 31, 2017, 6:16 PM), https://cpj.org/2017/07/journalistsdetained-attacked-and-threatened-amid-/ [https://perma.cc/MM3A-BPVP] (detailing government
attacks on journalists, protestors attacking and stealing the equipment of two photographers, and
soldiers threatening journalists); accord John Otis, Lawsuits and Economic Crisis Drive
Venezuela’s Journalists into Exile, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Dec. 18, 2018 12:08 PM),
https://cpj.org/2018/12/lawsuits-and-economic-crisis-drive-venezuelas-jour/ [https://perma.cc/A6
LW-QJQ5] (“Venezuelan reporters have been driven out amid President Nicolás Maduro’s efforts
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are typically imprisoned or detained and then deported.273
c.

Free and Fair Elections

The re-election of President Maduro in May 2018 for another six years
had several reports of “coercion, fraud and electoral rigging.”274 Maduro
preyed on the poor by making false promises of aid to those already
receiving benefit cards and subsidized food handouts if he was reelected.275 Another huge issue with Maduro’s re-election was that they
had an “exceptionally low” voter turnout with less than half of the country
actually voting.276 A Venezuelan Supreme Court Judge, Christian
Zerpa, fled the country and went to the United States stating that the
elections were unfair.277 Maduro knew the only way for him to win reelection was to ban key political leaders and the Opposition from
running.278 The election is traditionally held in December, but they
to control and intimidate the media. CPJ has found that these measures include arbitrary arrests,
defamation lawsuits, threats to cancel broadcast licenses, a government monopoly over the
importation and distribution of scarce newsprint, and an anti-hate law that mandates prison terms
for anyone who instigates hate or violence in the media.”); Allsop, supra note 267 (describing how
the harassment and sustained violence has led journalists—such as Elyangelica Gonzalez, a longtime radio reporter and many Senior reporters at Armando.info, an investigative website—to flee
the country).
273. Allsop, supra note 267 (describing three instances where the Venezuelan government
extend their war on journalism to foreign journalists. “In 2017 the government barred Nicholas
Casey, a correspondent from the Times, from re-entering the country after he left to take a
vacation. . . .
[L]ast year, Billy Six, a German free-lance journalist, was reportedly
imprisoned . . . on charges including espionage and rebellion. And just this week, . . . Kristoffer
Toft, a Danish Freelance reporter, was detained by airport security and subsequently deported”).
274. Ana Vanessa Herrero & Megan Specia, Venezuela is in Crisis. So How Did Maduro
Secure a Second Term?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/
world/americas/venezuela-maduro-inauguration.html [https://perma.cc/9KAR-FG4Z] (analyzing
the impact President Maduro’s re-election had on Venezuela).
275. Id. (describing how representatives of Maduro’s party targeted individuals who
registered to vote using their “Fatherland Card” and attempted to bribe them with government aid
in exchange for their vote).
276. Id. (“[A] crackdown on critics left several of them unable to participate. Opposition
leaders called for a boycott of the election, and that, combined with the disillusionment of many
longtime government supporters, meant the turnout was exceptionally low.”).
277. Venezuela Supreme Court Judge Christian Zerpa Flees to US, BBC (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46777851
[https://perma.cc/A4Q9-MNWC]
(explaining the former Maduro loyalist, Judge Christian Zerpa, fled to the United States, and
accused President Maduro of “systematically manipulating the affairs of the Supreme Court.”).
278. See William Neuman & Nicholas Casey, Venezuela Election Won by Maduro Amid
Widespread Disillusionment, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/20/
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moved the election up to May in order to disadvantage any opponent of
President Maduro.279 The elimination of the requirement to fingerprint
voters could have allowed some to vote multiple times.280 There were
even reports of individuals that worked in the government agency who
voted for Maduro out of fear of losing their jobs.281 Many people even
stated they felt pressured to vote for Maduro because they believed the
government computers tracked people’s votes.282
C. United States
1.

United States and the Rome Statute

The United States is not a state party to the Rome Statute and would
therefore not fall under their jurisdiction.283 While the United States
participated in the negotiations, they ultimately decided to vote against
the statute.284 In 2000, two years after the initial ratification of the Rome
Statute, Bill Clinton signed but decided not to submit it to the senate for
ratification.285 Then 2 years later, George W. Bush outright stated to the
UN secretary that the United States no longer intended to ratify the
treaty.286 The Bush administration felt so threatened by the possibility
of U.S. citizens being brought before the ICC that they pressured several
world/americas/venezuela-election.html [https://perma.cc/Y53N-VQRC] (“Mr. Maduro sought to
give himself every advantage in Sunday’s vote. The electoral authorities banned the largest
opposition political parties from taking part in the election, and key politicians were barred from
running.”).
279. Id.
280. Id. (illustrating the lengths the Maduro’s regime would enforce in order to ensure their
victory in the election).
281. Id. (depicting a woman’s account of waiting outside a polling place and the concern
she faced knowing her failure to vote would lead to the loss of her job loss since government
computers tracked who voted).
282. Id. (explaining it was a common notion for the Venezuelan government to track
people’s votes).
283. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 225.
284. Id. (discussing the complicated relationship between the ICC and the United States
after the United States adamantly refusal to be a party to the Rome Statute).
285. Id.; see Andrew Henderson, Six Countries that Aren’t a Part of the ICC, NOMAD
CAPITALIST, https://nomadcapitalist.com/2018/08/29/countries-arent-part-of-icc/ [https://perma.cc
/YX5U-4W42] (last updated Dec. 26, 2019, 1:36 PM) (arguing the United States deliberately chose
to not be party to the Rome Statute out of fear their identity would be threatened by the ICC).
286. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 225; Henderson, supra note 285 (“[D]uring Bill
Clinton’s presidency the treaty was signed and later revoked by George W. Bush, who was afraid
of the possibility of American soldiers being targeted by the international community.”).
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governments to enter into agreements requiring them not to surrender
U.S. citizens.287 Under the Trump administration, it was stated the
United States would not cooperate with the ICC and “threatened
retaliatory steps against ICC should the court investigate United States or
allied country citizens.”288 The United States threatened to impose bans
on visas of any ICC staff that is involved in any sort of “potential
investigation” of U.S. citizens.289 John Bolton, the U.S. National
Security Adviser, threatened ICC staff and other signatory countries with
“prosecutions and financial sanctions.”290 The main reason the United
States has denied signing the Rome Statute is that the ICC would be able
to hold U.S. military and political leaders to the global standard of
justice.291 The United States seems to want to mask the problem instead
of addressing past tortures and other abuses by government agents of the
United States.292 The United States does not want the ICC to investigate
and prosecute military members or other members of the government.293
The United States can solve the problem of the ICC prosecuting U.S.
citizens by taking it into their own hands and prosecuting those
individuals that have committed atrocious crimes and prosecuting them
themselves.294
287. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 225.
288. Id. (expressing how in the past twenty years, the United States’ position on joining the
ICC has not changed).
289. US Threatens International Criminal Court, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 15, 2019, 12:58
PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15/us-threatens-international-criminal-court [https://
perma.cc/U379-NQ7R] (expanding on the U.S.’s threat to the ICC through the imposition of visa
bans and how this action “will imperil [the United States’] accountability for grave international
crimes.”).
290. Id. (“Bolton was the architect of a hostile campaign against the ICC in the early 2000s
under the George W. Bush administration.”).
291. Lila Smith, Reasons Why the US is Not a Part of the ICC, THE ODYSSEY
(Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.theodysseyonline.com/reasons-why-the-us-is-not-part-of-the-icc
[https://perma.cc/YE7L-LRCE] (contending that if the United States signed the Rome statute then
“the United States would not be able to protect both its military and political leaders that have
committed crimes against humanity . . . .”).
292. US Threatens International Criminal Court, supra note 289 (noting the United States’
failure to join the ICC is a strategic attempt to prevent any investigation into the past and present
crimes committed by their citizens).
293. Smith, supra note 291.
294. Scheffer & Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 994–95 (2008) (proclaiming how the
United States could avoid its “ill-founded” concerns regarding the ICC if it decided to take initiative
to investigate U.S. nationals before U.S. courts).
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Constitutionality of the Rome Statute

If the United States becomes a party to the Rome Statute then that
would allow the United States to prosecute any American citizen or other
individual within its jurisdiction.295 The Rome Statute allows the United
States the first opportunity to investigate any U.S. citizen who may
become an ICC target.296 The U.S. citizen would be prosecuted under
U.S. federal law and therefore would not require any sort of ICC
investigation or intervention.297 The U.S. constitutional Due Process
rights of individuals would not become an issue if the United States
simply prosecuted those individuals in the United States first.298 One of
the biggest issues is that many within the United States make arguments
the Rome Statute violates Article III of the Constitution, which vests the
power in the Supreme Court.299 Some say allowing the ICC to be given
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens would “threaten the institutional integrity
of the Judicial Branch.”300 Americans have the constitutional right to
have all judicial power within the Supreme Court, as the highest court
that has jurisdiction over them.301 But if American citizens commit
atrocious crimes at an international level, then they should be prosecuted
even if the United States wants to protect them from prosecution.302 The
United States should be a party to the Rome Statute as it does not conflict
with the Constitution and is a highly independent fact finder ready to

295. Id. at 994 (stressing the degree of freedom given to the United States when becoming
party to the Rome Statute and noting the general principles surrounding the Statute are based on
American common law, and therefore are likely to be familiar to individuals from the
United States).
296. Id. at 986–87.
297. Id. at 994 (addressing how the ICC is not “a court of universal jurisdiction” and how
the Rome Statute invites courts to apply their laws in their country, thereby preempting the ICC’s
jurisdiction).
298. Id. at 995 (advancing the idea that the United States should be proactive in investigate
its citizens before the ICC begins its investigation in order to avoid constitutional due process rights
issues).
299. Id. at 1005 (identifying the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction has a critical bearing on
whether the Rome Statute violates Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution).
300. Id. (determining congress authorizes a non-Article III court to adjudicate Article III
business it would threaten the foundation of the Judicial Branch).
301. Id. (explaining the powers vested in the Supreme Court via the Constitution—
specifically Section 1, Article III—are in congruence with the ICC).
302. See generally id. at 983.
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prosecute individuals and groups that commit high level crimes.303
3.

Immigration Consequences

While many Venezuelans are staying in Latin America, there is still a
large portion of migrants fleeing to the United States and Europe.304 The
number of Venezuelans coming into the United States has nearly doubled
in the last decade to about 350,000.305 The Trump Administration
expressed support for the Venezuelan people during this humanitarian
crisis but refused to grant legal status to immigrants attempting to escape
these atrocities.306 A petition for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) was
filed by the Venezuelan American National Bar Association to allow
immigrants to come to the United States and escape the humanitarian
crisis; however, the TPS has been ignored by the Department of
Homeland Security.307 Typically, the only Venezuelans that are able to
afford the trip to the United States are educated professionals who are
coming to get any job they can.308 The number of Venezuelans deported

303. Id.
304. Rocio Cara Labrador, The Venezuelan Exodus, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.
(July 8, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/venezuelan-exodus [https://perma.cc/EW3T-N7YF]
(discussing the popular geographic locations where more than three million Venezuelans have
migrated to due to mass poverty, a ruined economy, and an immensely corrupt government).
305. Tim Henderson, Venezuelan Immigrants get Trump Sympathy but Not Status, PEW
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/10/02/
venezuelan-immigrants-get-trump-sympathy-but-not-status
[https://perma.cc/TZ99-GM8E]
(commenting on the significant increase of Venezuelan immigrants in the United States in more
recent years who are attempting to escape the severe economic and political crisis happening in
their home country).
306. Id. (“The Trump administration has provided about $100 million to house refugees in
countries neighboring Venezuela . . . .”).
307. Id. (“It is rare for the United States to grant blanket legal status for those escaping a
regime, but it was granted for Cubans until 2017.”).
308. Id. (stating how the highly educated class of Venezuelans are not working jobs
analogous to their credentials once they arrive in the United States because of their need to only
want to survive).
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last year increased from 182 to 248.309 Venezuela had the most Asylum
applications for the year of 2017–2018 with 28,919 applications.310 The
United States has given Temporary Protected Status to El Salvador,
Honduras, and Haiti, as well as a few other countries.311 For example,
El Salvador was given TPS by George W. Bush in 2001 because they
were struck by a 7.6 magnitude earthquake and then two more
earthquakes the following month.312 These earthquakes caused damages
across the country with approximately $2.8 billion in damage.313 Due to
the instability of the country and its citizen’s lives, the United States
granted El Salvadorian citizens Temporary Protected Status.314 The
Venezuelan people are being killed by their Government and the Maduro
regime, yet there has been no response from the United States on
protection with regard to TPS.315

309. See id. (emphasizing how the increased number of Venezuelan deportations leads to
increased constant fear of deportation from the United States); see also Manuel Madrid, Despite
Messages of Solidarity, the U.S. Still Deports Venezuelans, MIA. NEW TIMES INT’L NEWS
(Sept. 24, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/content/printView/11273793
[https://perma.cc/BHN2-3M5U] (“If they can deport a Venezuelan, they will. And if they can’t,
they leave them in jails for months.”).
310. Henderson, supra note 305 (“More Venezuelans are applying for asylum than any
other country, federal statistics show. But they don’t have much change of getting it, said
Kostencki[, president of the Venezuelan American Bar Association in Florida].”).
311. Fact Sheet: Temporary Protected Status (TPS), NAT’L IMMIGR. F. 2–3
(Sept. 17, 2020), https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/TPS-Fact-Sheet_
Updated-9_18_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/98C9-PAHK] (designating the different countries that
have been granted TPS as far back as 1999).
312. Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador, CLINIC LEGAL (June 13, 2018),
https://cliniclegal.org/resources/temporary-protected-status-el-salvador [https://perma.cc/H29EPBM6] (“The series of earthquakes resulted in 1,100 deaths and left more than 2,500 people
missing. Nearly 8,000 suffered injuries. Seventeen percent of El Salvador’s population (1.3 million
people) were displaced by the earthquakes and resulting landslides.”).
313. Id. (“[I]ncluding the destruction or damage of 220,000 homes, 1,696 schools and 856
other public building.”).
314. Id. (examining how the damage to El Salvador was deemed worthy of TPS by the
United States in 2001, whereas, Venezuelan immigrants fleeing extreme poverty provided by a
corrupted government have yet to receive TPS).
315. Senate Republicans Again Block Venezuela TPS Legislation, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELS. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/senaterepublicans-again-block-venezuela-tps-legislation- [https://perma.cc/333J-KHS7] (“For the fifth
time in the last 18 months, Senate Republicans blocked the Venezuela TPS Act of 2019, refusing
to affirm the U.S. government’s support for Venezuelans and allowing the Trump administration
to continue forcefully deporting them back to the Maduro regime.”).
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III. SOLUTIONS
A. ICC Prosecution
When the ICC prosecutes Maduro and other governmental officials,
only then can Venezuela move toward a democracy.316 There are young
politicians who are willing and able to bring democracy back into
Venezuela as long as the previous corrupted politicians pay for the crimes
they have committed.317 If Maduro and the other government officials
are convicted and sentenced, then Venezuela can be free to move towards
a new process of democracy.318

316. See Holly K. Sonneland, Explainer: The Case Against Venezuela in the ICC,
AM. SOC./COUNCIL OF AMS. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-caseagainst-venezuela-icc [https://perma.cc/9NE2-R8NJ] (elaborating on the importance of a
prosecutorial investigation being opened on the current Venezuelan regime); see also Venezuela:
ICC Prosecutor to Review Alleged Crimes, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 8, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/08/venezuela-icc-prosecutor-review-alleged-crimes [https://
perma.cc/DD9Z-QTAR] (“By opening a preliminary examination, the ICC prosecutor is sending a
powerful message that her office is closely tracking the Maduro government’s egregious abuses,”
said José Miguel Vivanco, American Director at Human Rights Watch.”).
317. See Dick Durbin, Sen. Dick Durbin: With Maduro out, Democracy is Finally Coming
to Venezuela—From Within, USA TODAY (Feb. 1, 2019, 3:15 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/voices/2019/02/01/dick-durbin-maduro-putin-trump-guaido-venezuela-column/273
5516002/ [https://perma.cc/QN4T-8M2X] (explaining how corrupt politicians in Venezuela have
created the dire need for change in the current political system and how young leaders, such as
interim President Guaidó, are willing to stand up against Maduro, regardless of the potential danger
he may face, to fight for a return to democracy for their country); see also Francisco Rodríguez,
The United States Helps Venezuela’s Regime Survive, FOREIGN AFFS. (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2020-10-09/united-states-helps-venezuelas-reg
ime-survive [http://perma.cc/77GB-QZUS] (“[Maduro] has refused to budge despite an economic
and humanitarian crisis larger than any the continent has ever seen, punitive oil sanctions, and the
fact that 58 countries recognize his rival Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s legitimate president.”).
318. See How to Restore Democracy in Venezuela, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELS. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_to_restore_democracy_in_
venezuela [https://perma.cc/F3NM-GT69] (noting if Maduro’s regime is defeated, Venezuela
stands a fighting chance at obtaining a democratic government and helping its citizens); see also
Franco Ordoñez, Amid Border Crackdown, White House May Shield Venezuelans from
Deportation, NPR (Aug. 2, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/02/747734905/amidborder-crackdown-white-house-may-shield-venezuelans-from-deportation [https://perma.cc/RQ
P7-D3XG] (“The situation is as bad or worse than what you see on television . . . . It’s run by a
group of people who do whatever they want and with great power. Really, that is not how you can
run a country. It’s not a democracy.”).
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B. Constitutional Amendments
With new amendments to the constitution pushing for a fair and
democratic process within the government, this could be a huge step
towards a free country.319 Amendments need to be implemented to
ensure elections are fair and the citizens of Venezuela are given basic
rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press.320 When it
comes to elections, there must be amendments to ensure there is no voter
fraud or political pressure to vote for any one candidate.321 As well as
allowing any and all eligible candidates from campaigning.322 There
should also be term limits added back to the constitution for the
President.323

319. See How to Restore Democracy in Venezuela, supra note 318 (explaining how making
changes to the constitution will progress Venezuelan government to make and work towards
solving its ongoing humanitarian crisis); cf. Constitutional History of Venezuela, supra note 238
(showing how the 1999 Constitutional Amendments drastically changed Venezuela’s governmental
structure and it’s continued affect in 2020).
320. How to Restore Democracy in Venezuela, supra note 318 (stating in order for
Venezuela to achieve democracy, the country requires a complete transformation which includes
changing the way elections are handled).
321. See Joe Parkin Daniels, Venezuela: Who is Juan Guaidó, The Man Who Declared
Himself President?, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2019, 14:02 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2019/jan/15/juan-guaido-venezuelan-opposition-leader-challenging-maduros-rule [https://
perma.cc/J8FU-3HN2] (detailing the political corruption present in Venezuela and how a change
to the country’s constitution is essential in driving the country back towards democracy); see also,
e.g., UN Human Rights Report on Venezuela Urges Immediate Measure to Halt and Remedy Grave
Rights Violations, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R (July 4, 2019),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24788&amp;LangID
=E [https://perma.cc/ZC9R-TU9U] (reviewing the numerous human rights violations committed in
Venezuela, including suppressing political opponents from running against the current President);
see also Kyle Rempfer & Todd South, There are Mounting Signs of Military Planning for
Venezuela, MIL. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/
03/15/there-are-mounting-signs-of-military-planning-for-venezuela/ [https://perma.cc/3VRV-RK
5X] (discussing the possibility of needing military intervention in Venezuela to control the
widespread political corruption rampant in the country).
322. Daniels, supra note 321 (emphasizing the need for a political reformation in Venezuela
to ensure the electoral process is free and fair).
323. Constitutional History of Venezuela, supra note 238 (“Constitutional reform in 2009
further strengthened the presidency in Venezuela as 54% of Venezuelan voters backed a
constitutional amendment that abolished term limits for elected officials, including the president”
and further led to an increased and continued corruption).
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C. Immigration—Temporary Protected Status
Temporary Protected Status provides individuals with work permits
and stay of deportation in the United States.324 TPS is usually given to
certain countries that are experiencing an environmental disaster or
extraordinary conditions, including violence.325 TPS can usually be
given to an entire country for anywhere between six and eighteen months,
but this can always be continuously extended.326 Then, sixty days prior
to the expiration of the protected status, the Secretary of Homeland
Security must decide whether to extend or terminate the TPS based on
the conditions of the foreign country.327 This can be a temporary
solution until Venezuela can get back to democracy.328 Many of the
individuals that would be coming to the United States would be well
educated.329 Congress has proposed a bill to give Venezuelans
Temporary Protected Status, which has been passed in the house and is
now in the process of being evaluated by the senate.330 There are already
many Venezuelans in the United States; this bill would prevent them from
being deported and allow them to get jobs.331 Former President Trump
324. Temporary Protected Status: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (May 21, 2019),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/temporary-protected-status-overview
[https://perma.cc/5SN7-5MRW] (outlining the requirements and benefits individuals can receive
by obtaining Temporary Protected Status in the United States).
325. Id. (listing the various circumstances under which a country is eligible to receive
temporary protected status designation).
326. Id. (articulating how short-lived Temporary Protected Status is for individuals who are
fortunate enough to receive it).
327. Id. (expanding on the stringent guidelines in place for terminating and/or extending
temporary protected status for countries).
328. Id. (alluding to the benefits that countries designated for TPS allow its citizens to
receive by providing a means of escape from dire and catastrophic conditions within their country
and temporarily remaining in the United States as a safe haven).
329. See generally NAT’L IMMIGR. F., supra note 311 (detailing how individuals from TPS
designated countries have a positive impact and contribute to the economy of the United States).
330. Venezuela TPS Act of 2019, H.R. 549, 116th Cong. § 244 (2019) (emphasizing the
purpose of the bill is to designate Venezuela under Temporary Protected Status pursuant to section
224 of the Immigration and Nationality Act); Senate Republicans Again Block Venezuela TPS
Legislation, supra note 315 (emphasizing the lack of Senate support on this bill which has not been
approved as of September 2020—due to republicans blocking the bill).
331. NAT’L IMMIGR. F., supra note 311 (portraying the advantages of obtaining TPS and
the protections received to individuals under that status); see, e.g., Alex Daugherty, Democrats Will
Force a House Vote on TPS for Venezuelans. They’ll Need GOP Support, MIA. HERALD (July 22,
2019, 11:58 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/
article232966177.html [https://perma.cc/2KSW-VNUM] (discussing the widespread benefits of
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issued sanctions and supported Democracy for Venezuela, and, without
congressional approval, he could have given Venezuelans TPS, but he
refused to do so.332 Once TPS is granted to Venezuelans, the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security can continue to monitor
the conditions of the country and continuously review the country’s
Temporary Protected Status.333
D. U.S. Military Intervention
On a command of the President, the U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force,
Marines, and Coast Guard could potentially send thousands of troops into
Venezuela.334 Former President Trump discussed the possibility of
sending troops into Venezuela in order to “force regime change,” but
there are dire consequences for this action.335 Many individuals are
estimating that in order for the military to be successful in overthrowing
the current administration in Venezuela it would require somewhere
between 100,000 and 150,000 troops.336 Many opponents to military
intervention in Venezuela by the United States say this invasion could
result in a war that resembled the Iraq war, which would result in many
deaths of both Venezuelan and U.S. citizens and could possibly last
several years.337 But the Venezuelan citizens are already constantly
dying from their own government either due to food shortages, medicine

passing the bill to grant TPS to Venezuelans, including the opportunity work and remain in the
United States lawfully); see also Sonia Osorio, Venezuelan Population in U.S. has Seen Explosive
Growth Since 2000, MIA. HERALD (Sept. 19, 2019, 4:59 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article235250772.html [https://perma.cc/L736-2B
SY] (discussing the explosive growth of the Venezuelan population in the United States over the
last generation).
332. Daugherty, supra note 331 (“The Department of Homeland Security hasn’t moved
forward with TPS for Venezuelans a full seven months after the U.S. [and President Trump]
recognized Juan Guaido as the country’s legitimate leader even though Nicolas Maduro maintains
control of the military and lucrative oil fields.”).
333. NAT’L IMMIGR. F., supra note 311.
334. Rempfer & South, supra note 321 (contemplating the consequences of United States
military intervention in Venezuela responding to the crisis under Maduro’s continued political
control).
335. Id. (“‘It’s a regime that, frankly, could be toppled very quickly by the military if the
military decides to do that.’ Trump said in September [of 2018]”).
336. Id. (emphasizing the implications of a possible military intervention in Venezuela).
337. Id. (“‘It would be prolonged, it would be ugly, there would be massive
casualties . . . .’”).
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shortages, or even during protests.338 There needs to be a change in
Venezuela, and a military intervention by the United States should be the
last resort that could ultimately change the country around.339
CONCLUSION
Over the past few decades, Venezuela has been run by two major
presidents that have led to the incredible downfall of an entire country.340
Most importantly, Maduro has pushed the country to one of the biggest
humanitarian crises the world has ever seen.341 There are electricity
blackouts, food shortage, medicine shortage, and more.342 The inflation
rate has essentially made the Venezuelan currency worthless.343 All the
338. Id. (portraying examples of the devastation people in Venezuela experience).
339. Id. (“‘They’re not trying to provoke a war,’ according to Fulton T. Armstrong, a former
CIA analyst with significant Latin American experience. ‘They’re trying to provoke the
Venezuelan military to rise up and overthrow Maduro . . . .’”).
340. See, e.g., Patrick Kiger, How Venezuela Fell from the Richest Country in South
America into Crisis, HIST. (May 9, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/venezuela-chavezmaduro-crisis [https://perma.cc/F4SE-7U8Z] (criticizing both Chávez and Maduro regimes for
having contributed to the economic collapse of Venezuela); Vox, The Collapse of Venezuela,
Explained, YOUTUBE (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1gUR8wM5vA
[https://perma.cc/C5LD-LAQC] (emphasizing Maduro, like Chavez, has also rigged the economy
to keep himself in power and consistently destroys the poor individuals in the country).
341. Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and U.S. Policy Responses:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade,
116th Cong. 6 (2019) (statement by Ted Yoho, Representative for Ambassador Rooney),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20190226/108946/HHRG-116-FA07-Transcript-2019
0226.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q95N-TBKE] (“[T]he socialist policies, corruption, and economic
mismanagement by the Maduro regime have destroyed what was once the most prosperous, the
most prosperous country in Latin America and created one of the greatest exoduses of people,
wealth, and talent in recent historical memories.”).
342. See generally Venezuela’s Humanitarian Emergency, Large Scale UN Response
Needed to Address Health and Food Crises, HUM. RTS. WATCH (April 4, 2019),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/04/04/venezuelas-humanitarian-emergency/large-scale-un-respo
nse-needed-address-health [https://perma.cc/98SQ-UKRL] (bolstering the argument that
Venezuela is undergoing a massive humanitarian crisis that demands the aid of UN medical
professionals to ease the spread of fast growing diseases and remedy shortages of basic necessities);
see generally Melody Schreiber, Researchers Are Surprised by the Magnitude of Venezuela’s
Health Crisis, NPR (Apr. 5, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/
2019/04/05/709969632/researchers-are-surprised-by-the-magnitude-of-venezuelas-health-crisis
[https://perma.cc/FV5T-WFWV] (providing firsthand testimony from medical professionals in
Venezuela who are witnessing malnourished children in hospitals and basic diseases that are
curable with simple vaccines resurfacing).
343. See Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, How Venezuela Went from the Richest Economy in
South America to the Brink of Financial Ruin, INDEP. (May 21, 2017, 17:07 PM),
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issues in the country has led to the multitude of protests by citizens as a
call to the government to fix these humanitarian issues.344 This
humanitarian crisis has led to approximately four million people to leave
their homes to several other countries around to world.345
Accountability for the current Venezuelan presidency and the
government’s various human rights violations must be dealt with
fairly.346 International assistance will be crucial to ensure that
Venezuelans are given a smooth transition back to democracy.347 This
transition should be used to unify all Venezuelans.348 The ways of
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/how-venezuela-went-from-the-richest-economyin-south-america-to-the-brink-of-financial-ruin-a7740616.html https://perma.cc/AM6P-QESH]
(noting, as of 2016, Venezuela’s economy has shrunk by ten percent and its currency is almost
worthless due to a 700 percent inflation rate); see also Stephen Keppel, 5 Ways Hugo Chavez Has
Destroyed the Venezuelan Economy, ABC NEWS (January 17, 2013, 7:22 PM), https://abcnews.
go.com/ABC_Univision/News/ways-chavez-destroyed-venezuelan-economy/story?id=18239956
[https://perma.cc/KW64-2W2H] (“[T]he Bolivar fuerte, is anything but strong. . . . [It] has lost
nearly two-thirds of its value since it was launched in 2008.”).
344. See, e.g., Kiger, supra note 340 (providing an example of a massive uprising led by
Juan Guaidó against the Maduro regime).
345. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 342 (“WFP has provided assistance to more
than 100,000 Venezuelans in Colombia and Ecuador. At the Brazilian border with Venezuela,
UNHCR has established 13 shelters that house more than 6,850 Venezuelans who receive shelter,
medical care, and food.”); see also, e.g., Schreiber, supra note 342 (supporting the contention that
Venezuelan citizens cannot receive basic medical attention within their country and are left with
no alternative but to flee to neighboring countries like Brazil and Colombia in order to survive).
346. Ensuring Accountability in Venezuela is Key to End Rights Crisis, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(July 5, 2019, 6:30 AM), http://www.admin.hrw.org/news/2019/07/05/ensuring-accountabilityvenezuela-key-end-rights-crisis-0#
[https://perma.cc/RTA7-DK9N]
(“[T]he
UN
High
Commissioner’s strong report, which includes key information on the major human rights problems
in Venezuela . . . recommends that the Human Rights Council request OHCHR to ‘focus on
ensuring accountability for human rights violations and abuses in Venezuela, including by
enhancing its monitoring, documentation, analysis, and public reporting on the human rights
situation.’ In this regard, the creation of a Commission of Inquiry, which was recommended in the
previous OHCHR report, should be a key priority in advancing accountability, given overwhelming
evidence that the situation in Venezuela has worsened in recent months.”).
347. Moises Rendon & Mark Schneider, Analyzing Obstacles to Venezuela’s Future, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDS. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/analyzingobstacles-venezuelas-future?amp [https://perma.cc/3H3B-XECM] (“[T]o mitigate the
politicization of justice, international assistance and credibility will be crucial to ensure that
reconciliation accompanies the transition and that Venezuelans feel confident the country is
establishing the rule of law.”).
348. Id. (“Constructing an effective transitional justice system will require that truth is
assured to the victims. The most effective systems have been those where international
involvement has been present. Venezuela’s transitional justice would be uniquely challenging but
can benefit from the lessons of other international truth commissions, as in El Salvador, and
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bringing justice to the people of Venezuela is to have corrupt
governmental individuals charged and convicted by the ICC.349
Amending the Venezuelan constitution to ensure the power is with the
people once again.350 Possibly during this transition or even before,
giving immigrants Temporary Protected Status until the country can be
restored.351 As a last-ditch effort, if nothing else is successful, to have
the United States intervene with its military.352
A key question that also has to be addressed is how to ensure
Venezuela does not return to a dictatorship and ensuring another
individual similar to Maduro and Chavez does not take office.353 With
the implementation of a new constitution along with the younger
Venezuelan politicians that are working to bring democracy back to

national truth commissions, as in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Guatemala, as well as others in
Africa and elsewhere.”).
349. Claire Felter, The Role of The International Criminal Court, THE COUNS. ON FOREIGN
RELS. (May 30, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court
[https://perma.cc/QJ82-SGHQ].
350. Cf. Venezuela: A Democratic Crisis, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/ademocratic-crisis-in-venezuela#restoring [https://perma.cc/7VT9-X6T7] (“Maduro and his inner
circle dismantle Venezuelan democracy piece by piece, as they plunder the country’s natural
resources to enrich themselves. A devastating health and humanitarian crisis continues to grow,
with consequences for our whole hemisphere. The United States seeks a peaceful restoration of
democracy in Venezuela.”).
351. See generally NAT’L IMMIGR. F., supra note 311 (“[T]emporary Protected Status is
granted by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (Secretary) to eligible foreignborn individuals who are unable to return home safely due to conditions or circumstances
preventing their country from adequately handling the return.”).
352. See Rempfer & South, supra note 321 (“White House officials say ‘all options on the
table,’ including a military intervention or military support of allies in the region.”). But see
Karen DeYoung & Anthony Faiola, Trump Administration to Tap into Frozen Venezuelan
Government Funds to Revive Efforts to Oust Maduro, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2020, 12:28 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-administration-to-tap-into-frozen-vene
zuelan-government-funds-to-revive-efforts-to-oust-maduro/2020/08/20/b0024968-df20-11ea-809
e-b8be57ba616e_story.html [https://perma.cc/XQA3-PRPE] (“Trump has repeatedly said that ‘all
options are on the table’ for dealing with Maduro, a coded reference to possible use of force. But
more than a year and a half after the United States recognized Guaidó as interim president and
imposed sanctions on oil, the lifeblood of the national economy, he’s shown no inclination to use
it.”).
353. Cf. How to Restore Democracy in Venezuela, supra note 318 (“Ninety percent of
Venezuelans, by no means a small amount, want Maduro to go, including a group of the Chavistas.
But Maduro has 90 percent of the weapons, both the regular ones in the hands of the armed forces
and the irregular ones belonging to the so-called “collectives” who are paramilitary assassins.”).
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Venezuela, democracy is available.354 The citizens of Venezuela are
also rightfully striving and pushing for a leader that will represent them
and do what is best for the country as a whole.355

354. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 321 (“ Juan Guaidó, the 35-year-old leader of
Venezuela’s opposition-controlled national assembly, was an unknown figure on the international
stage. That changed on Wednesday, when the young politician stood before thousands of protesters
in Caracas and swore himself in as interim president. . . . He’s part of . . . a brave generation that
grew up under a dictatorship” and seeks democracy and freedom for the people of Venezuela).
355. David Smilde, Venezuelans Want President Maduro Out, but Most Would Oppose
Foreign Military Intervention to Remove Him, THE WORLD (Jan. 10, 2019, 5:15 PM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-01-08/venezuelans-want-president-maduro-out-most-would-opp
ose-foreign-military [https://perma.cc/ACM6-6Q9A]; Markos Kounalakis, Venezuelans Will Have
to Fight for Their Democracy. Trump Can’t, and Won’t, do it for Them, MIA. HERALD
(May 3, 2019, 12:32 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article229939659.html
[https://perma.cc/78QE-W7DX] (“[T]he good people of Venezuela . . . are victims of “President”
Nicholás Maduro and his regime’s continual and cynically systemic use of food and energy
resources to keep political friends and allies happy while shunting and starving his opponents.
Millions have chosen to leave and live in exile as refugees, while others head to the Venezuelan
streets to topple Maduro.”).
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